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NIETZSCHE’S	CIRCLE:	AND	A	WAY	OUT!	
JORDAN	FINKLE	ABSTRACT	In	the	always	connected	and	fast-paced	modern	world	we	live	in,	questions	about	who	we	are,	what	our	values	are,	and	how	to	act	are	more	pertinent	than	ever.	What	better	way	to	reconcile	these	questions	than	turning	to	a	seemingly	out	of	touch	19th	century	German	philosopher,	Friedrich	Nietzsche?	Interestingly	enough,	Nietzsche	lamented	that	his	contemporaries	would	never	understand	his	work;	similarly,	he	thought	of	his	own	work	as	directed	towards	‘philosophers	of	the	future.’	As	any	present	moment	passes	and	as	history	progresses,	we,	in	a	sense,	run	away	from	ourselves.	This	projecting	of	oneself	into	the	future	is	unavoidable.	Could	one	ever	strictly	pin	down	oneself	in	such	a	way	to	eliminate	this	problem	of	time?	Of	course	not!	This	is	an	absurd	question.	What	we	should	really	be	asking	is	can	we	at	least	exist	in	a	way	that	is	at	one	with	the	movement	of	time	and	the	immediacy	of	modern	technology?	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	illuminate	what	would	be	involved	in	the	task	of	figuring	out	how	to	authentically	be-alongside-oneself	in	this	way,	qua	Nietzsche.	However,	once	we,	if	successful,	are	able	to	achieve	a	mode	of	being-alongside-ourselves,	it	is	fruitless,	in	a	sense;	we	are	always	being	thrown	into	the	future	and	are	therefore	no	longer	alongside-ourselves	as	such.	This	is	why	we	shall	pivot	at	the	end	of	this	paper	in	order	to	suggest	how	it	is	possible	to	orient	our	being-thrown-into-the-future	in	the	most	useful	and	timely	way.	
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Introduction	What	if	it	was	possible	catch	up	to	ourselves,	to	race	forward	into	the	future	alongside	ourselves?	Could	this	be	the	only	way	to	truly	find	meaning	in	life	and	be	happy	in	modernity?	When	we	think	about	the	concept	of	selfhood	we	cannot	avoid	the	problem	of	the	existence	of	the	self	over	time;	this	is	why	we	must	catch	up	to	ourselves	if	we	are	to	be	alongside	ourselves,	if	we	are	to	be	ourselves.	We	can	begin	the	process	of	uncovering	meaning	from	the	problem	of	the	existence	of	the	self	over	time	by	identifying	three	specific	aspects	of	the	self	in	time:	the	self	in	the	present,	the	self	in	the	past,	and	the	self	in	the	future.	Any	robust	notion	of	selfhood	must	touch	upon	the	self	in	these	three	temporal	states.			 The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	understand	Friedrich	Nietzsche’s	conception	of	selfhood	and	in	doing	so,	by	virtue	of	our	three	distinctions,	we	hope	to	catch	up	to	ourselves	in	time.	This	will	allow	us	to	make	meaningful	suggestions	about	how	best	to	orient	ourselves	towards	the	future	based	on	who	we	are	and	who	we	have	been.	The	purpose	of	orienting	ourselves	towards	the	future	in	this	way	is	to	come	up	with	a	more	complete	and	useful	way	of	discussing	and	understanding	how	to	be	happy	or	rather	to	be	able	to	find,	uncover,	create	meaning	for	ourselves	in	our	time.			 This	paper	is	divided	into	three	chapters;	the	themes	of	the	three	chapters	correspond	to	a	different	temporal	aspect	of	selfhood,	i.e.	the	self	in	the	present,	the	past,	and	the	future.	Of	course,	since	these	different	aspects	of	the	self	are,	in	actuality,	unified,	each	section	presupposes	conclusions	from	the	other	two	and	will	necessarily	bleed	into	each	other.	In	the	conclusion,	an	attempt	is	made	to	jump	out	
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of	this	cyclical	dance	between	present,	past,	and	future.	Certain	parallels	between	the	content	of	Nietzsche’s	writing	and	the	stylistic	form	in	which	he	presents	it	helps	ground	the	purpose	of	his	philosophy	and	its	deliberately	unsystematic	character.		I	conclude	by	suggesting	how	certain	Buddhist	principles	can	help	a	self,	in	the	Nietzschean	context,	psychologically	orient	itself	in	the	present	towards	finding	meaning	in	life	through	the	future	after	coming	to	know	one’s	past	as	such.		
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Chapter	One:	Nietzsche’s	Philosophy	of	Mind	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	is	a	fitting	place	to	begin	this	investigation	since	it	can	be	read	as	focusing	on	the	self	in	the	present.		In	this	section,	we	will	attempt	to	fix	and	contain	the	notion	of	‘the	self	in	the	present’	in	order	to	illustrate	some	of	its	constituent	parts,	unconscious	states	and	conscious	states.	In	this	illustration,	we	will	make	hard	distinctions	between	conscious	states	and	unconscious	states	in	order	to	emphasize	their	differences	and	possible	incompatibility.	These	distinctions,	however,	will	be	softened	at	the	end	of	this	section	to	make	a	larger	point	and	to	move	forward.	We	will	see	how	unconscious	states	both	compete	with	as	well	as	generate	conscious	states	in	order	to	create	our	perspective.	This	created	perspective,	in	its	‘fixed’	state	in	the	present	will	be	fragmented	(not	unified),	incomplete	(perspectival),	and	transformative	(linguistic	conceptualization).	This	created	perspective,	we	will	see,	becomes	distorted	in	its	historical	instantiation.	This	process	of	the	becoming	of	consciousness	and	its	historical	instantiation	will	not	only	parallel	how	Nietzsche’s	aphoristic	style	affects	the	reader,	it	will	also	illustrate	how	and	why	Nietzsche	thinks	we	need	to	create	meaning	out	of	our	perspectivally	distorted	condition.	Further,	this	competing-generating	nature	will	parallel	how	honesty	and	artistry	compete	with	and	regulate	each	other	in	order	to	create	a	truthful	illusion	that	redeems	the	meaning	in	life.	This	interconnectivity	between	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	and	his	philosophy	of	meaning,	their	respective	parallels	between	their	content	and	form,	as	well	as	the	overall	parallels	between	the	content	and	form	of	both	sets	of	theories	will	allow	us	to	suggest	why	Nietzsche	
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was	so	poetic.	Nietzsche	does	not	write	out	the	‘dos	and	don’ts’	of	his	philosophy	of	mind	in	one	concise	and	systematic	treatise.	Instead,	he	hints	at	important	ruling	principles	and	deliberately	contradicts	himself	or	is	purposefully	vague	while	discussing	his	theories	on	conscious	states,	unconscious	states,	perspective,	and	distortion.	Further,	Nietzsche	does	so	over	the	course	of	various	publications.	The	purpose	and	affect	of	these	stylistic	choices	will	be	illustrated	after	investigating	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	in	more	detail.	Chapters	Two	and	Three	of	Paul	Katsafanas’s	The	Nietzschean	Self	serve	as	my	life	raft	in	the	form(less)	sea	of	the	content	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind.	Nietzsche	himself	discusses	the	influence	exercised	on	his	own	theories	of	consciousness	by	three	philosophers:	Gottfried	Leibniz,	Immanuel	Kant,	and	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel.		He	explicates	their	influence	on	him	in	The	Gay	Science	Book	357.	By	exploring	the	Leibnizian,	Kantian,	and	Hegelian	understandings	of	the	relationship	between	conscious	states	and	unconscious	states	not	only	will	we	be	able	to	see	their	respective	influence	on	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind,	but	we	will	also	be	able	to	see	how	the	experience	of	consciousness	of	a	self	in	the	present	is	necessarily	fragmented,	incomplete,	and	transformative;	at	the	end	we	will	also	suggest	that	this	conception	of	the	self	in	the	present	as	perspectival	lends	itself	to	a	conception	of	the	self	in	the	present	as	being	perspectivally	distorted.	This	shape	of	distortion	becomes	concrete,	however,	only	in	its	historical	instantiation.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	parts,	one	for	the	connection	with	each	philosopher.	
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1.1	The	Leibniz	Connection:	Consciousness	&	Unconsciousness,	Language	&	
Conceptualization	Nietzsche	states	that	Leibniz’s	great	contribution	to	philosophy	is	the	sacrilegious	thought	that	consciousness	is	not	the	alpha	and	omega	of	the	human	character;	Leibniz	thinks	that	our	thoughts	constitute	our	consciousness	in	a	way	that	is	not	necessarily	objectively	true.	Nietzsche	states,	“Leibniz’s	incomparable	insight…that	consciousness	is	merely	an	accidens	(accident,	inessential	property)	of	the	power	of	representation	and	not	its	necessary	and	essential	attribute;	so	what	we	call	consciousness	constitutes	only	one	state	of	our	spiritual	and	psychic	world	(perhaps	a	sick	state)	and	by	no	means	the	whole	of	it”	(GS	357).	Here,	we	see	Nietzsche	himself	praises	the	sacrilege	of	Leibniz’s	idea	that	consciousness	not	only	has	constituent	parts,	but	also	that	it	is,	itself,	merely	an	inessential	part	of	the	totality	of	representation.	This	assertion	is	pretty	stark	since	many	of	us	(as	well	as	many	philosophers)	typically	think	that	consciousness	is	the	most	important,	trustworthy,	and	paradigmatically	human	aspect	of	the	mind.	Leibniz	employs	an	example	of	how	the	roar	of	the	surf,	which	is	typically	thought	of	as	a	singular	and	unified	sound	of	a	wave,	when	reflected	upon,	is	actually	an	amalgamation	of	sounds	created	by	the	crashing	of	many	individual	drops	of	water	onto	many	individual	grains	of	sand.	Just	as	we	perceive	one	roar,	conscious	perceptions	are	actually	made	up	of	individual	petites	perceptions,	which	are	inaccessible	to	the	consciousness,	according	to	Leibniz.	Nietzsche	credits	Leibniz	as	discovering,	so	to	speak,	the	unconscious	and	how	the	combination	of	unconscious	states	constitutes	
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conscious	states.	A	simple	acknowledgement	of	the	role	the	unconscious	plays	in	the	formulation	of	conscious	states	has	its	bearings	in	the	Nietzsche	as	well.	Nietzsche	states,	“All	qualities	of	a	person	of	which	he	is	conscious…are	subject	to	laws	of	development	entirely	different	from	those	qualities	which	are…badly	known	to	him”	(GS	8).	The	way	in	which	these	laws	of	development,	which	generate	conscious	states,	do	not	form	a	unified	Ego	is	best	illustrated	by	way	of	a	brief	digression	to	the	theories	of	Sigmund	Freud.		Katsafanas	reminds	us	of	a	common	misconception	of	Freud’s	theories,	a	reminder	that	will	help	make	sense	of	Leibniz’s	theory	in	an	essentially	Nietzschean,	but	initially	counterintuitive	way.	In	this	pseudo-Freudian	model,	the	unconscious	is	a	fully	formed	system	that	competes	with	the	fully	formed	system	of	the	conscious.	This	understanding	is	clearly	at	odds	with	the	Leibnizian	tradition	of	the	unconscious;	Leibniz	states	that	unconscious	states	constitute	or	generate	conscious	states	while	this	pseudo-Freudian	model	states	that	unconscious	states	are	distinct	from	and	compete	with	conscious	states.	What	is	shared	in	these	two	traditions	is	that	unconscious	states	are	not	accessible	to	introspection	but	the	reasons	as	to	why	this	is	the	case	differ.	Although,	initially,	these	two	theories	seem	at	odds	with	each	other,	Nietzsche’s	theory	employs	Leibniz’s	understanding	in	a	way	that	may	account	for	the	unconscious	as	both	generating	as	well	as	competing	with	the	conscious.	As	the	argument	goes,	consciousness,	for	Nietzsche,	does	not	refer	to	a	unified	substantive	faculty	characterized	by	causal	efficacy;	this	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	conscious	states	are	epiphenomenal,	however,	because	for	Nietzsche,	
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they	are	not.	Despite	the	allure	of	such	a	way	of	thinking	about	conscious	states,	Nietzsche	vehemently	denies	the	idea	of	an	Ego	in	terms	of	a	unified	substantive	faculty.	Nietzsche	denies	the	Ego	in	this	way	because	he	thinks	that,	as	Katsafanas	notes,	“our	best	accounts	of	thinking,	feeling,	and	willing	do	not	mention	an	Ego.	In	other	words,	the	Ego	is	a	fictional	concept;	nothing	corresponds	to	it”	(NS	25).	A	reformulation	of	this	refined	denial	of	a	unified	Ego,	but	not	of	consciousness	can	be	understood	as	“subject-multiplicity,”	which	would,	in	turn,	negate	the	possibility	of	a	unifying	structure	behind	a	multiplicity	of	unconscious	mental	states,	the	sum	of	which	could	be	denoted	as	consciousness	or	the	‘Ego.’	This	ruling	out	of	the	possibility	of	a	“behind-the-scenes,”	unifying	‘Consciousness’	is	consistent	with	Nietzsche’s	crusade	against	all	reifying	concepts	and	is	the	grounds	for	our	assertion	that	consciousness	is	fragmented	in	some	sense.		If	consciousness	is	to	be	understood	as	not	having	a	unified,	behind	the	scenes	Ego	or	as	fragmented,	then	the	conscious	state	generated	by	the	competition	of	unconscious	states	must	not	be	a	unification	of	the	totality	of	these	states	involved	in	the	generation.	In	order	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	relations	between	unconscious	states	and	conscious	states	in	a	way	that	can	possibly	reconcile	our	Leibnizian	and	pseudo-Freudian	models,	it	is	important	to	note,	as	Katsafanas	does,	why	unconscious	states	must	lie	outside	of	introspective	awareness	as	well	as	how	they	are	introspectively	inaccessible	in	our	conception	of	unconscious	states	thus	far.	The	answer	to	these	questions	(why	and	how)	will	have	something	to	do	with	the	initial	utility	of	consciousness.		
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If	the	unconscious	cannot	be	accessed	by	a	conscious	state,	one	could	infer	that	this	renders	the	conscious	state	slightly	more	impotent	than	one	would	typically	feel	comfortable	with.	Katsafanas	asserts	that	consciousness	as	such	is	not	completely	useless.	Nietzsche	notes	that	the	utility	of	consciousness	actually	stems	from	the	impotence	of	man,	from	the	need	to	communicate	in	order	to	survive.	Clearly,	this	conception	of	consciousness	cannot	stem	from	the	same	type	of	communication	used	by	animals,	since	they	do	not	have	conscious	states	in	the	way	humans	do.	That	is	why	Nietzsche	notes	the	specifically	linguistic	character	of	the	communicative	utility	of	conscious	states.	Nietzsche	states:	[T]he	[continual]	thinking	that	rises	to	consciousness	is	only	the	smallest	part	of	all	this	–	the	most	superficial	and	worst	part	–	for	only	this	conscious	thinking	occurs	in	words,	which	is	to	say	signs	of	
communication	and	this	fact	uncovers	the	origin	of	consciousness.	In	brief,	the	development	of	language	and	the	development	of	consciousness	(not	of	Reason	but	merely	of	the	way	Reason	enters	consciousness)	go	hand	in	hand.		(GS	354)		This	linguistic	character	of	conscious	thinking	is	unique	to	consciousness	and	is	not	involved	in	unconscious	processes.	For	Nietzsche,	understanding	a	concept	is	the	same	as	understanding	a	concept’s	place	in	the	system	of	relations	between	all	concepts,	which	entails	the	mutual	necessity	of	words	and	concepts.		By	asserting	the	linguistic	character	of	consciousness,	Nietzsche	is	also	asserting	that,	“conscious	thinking	is	conceptually	articulated…conscious	mental	
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states	have	conceptual	content”	(NS	29).	This	is	an	important	move	in	the	distinction	between	conscious	and	unconscious	states	because,	as	Katsafanas	states,	while	conscious	states	have	conceptual	content,	unconscious	states	have	nonconceptual	content.	Further,	by	asserting	the	linguistic	character	of	consciousness,	Nietzsche	is	also	asserting	that	conscious	states	will	somehow	be	an	insufficient	representation	of	the	self,	overtly	influenced	by	the	common	aspect	of	the	possibility	of	communication;	this	suggests	that	consciousness	is	transformative	in	its	linguistic	determination.	Nietzsche,	in	discussing	how	an	individual	can	communicate	to	a	group,	laments,	“Must	he	not	first	translate	himself	into	the	grotesquely	obvious	and	present	his	entire	person	and	cause	in	this	coarsened	and	simplified	version?”	(GS	236).	Obviously,	Nietzsche	thinks	that	the	communicability	of	conscious	states	somehow	dumbs	down	who	the	person	is.		The	point	here	is	that	a	person	can	only	communicate	a	portion	of	himself,	his	conscious	states,	thus	presenting	a	‘coarsened	and	simplified	version’	or	dumbed	down	version	of	himself.		Nietzsche	hints	at	why	this	limited	or	dumbed	down	version	is	necessarily	the	case,	when	he	remarks:	“Even	one’s	thoughts	one	cannot	entirely	reproduce	in	words”	(GS	244).	Clearly,	Nietzsche	thinks	that	we	cannot	express	our	unconscious	states	in	words.	Again,	this	impossibility	stems	from	two	facts	about	the	self	in	the	present	and	foreshadows	the	incomplete	and	transformative	character	of	consciousness.	First,	that	unconscious	states	are	inaccessible	to	conscious	states	(conscious	states	cannot	speak	about	something	it	cannot	know)	and,	second,	conscious	states	have	conceptual	content,	which	allows	them	to	be	conceptually	
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articulated	or	communicated	in	language,	while	unconscious	states	have	nonconceptual	content	and	cannot	be	communicated	as	such.		Nietzsche	illustrates	this	inaccessibility	of	unconscious	states	to	conscious	states	by	stating	that	we	cannot	prove	our	conscious	concepts	by	way	of	what	they	refer	to	(unconscious	nonconceptual	states)	since	the	reference	is	inaccessible	to	the	referrer.		 Our	opinions,	valuations,	and	tables	of	what	is	good	are	certainly	some	of	the	most	powerful	levers	in	the	machinery	of	our	action,	but	that	in	each	case,	the	law	of	its	mechanism	is	unprovable.	(GS	335,	emphasis	added)	Again,	this	‘unprovability,’	so	to	speak,	goes	hand	in	hand	with	the	inability	to	linguistically	express	unconscious	states	in	conscious	states.		As	Nietzsche	explains:	
Consciousness	in	general	has	developed	only	under	the	pressure	of	the	
need	to	communicate…[The	fact]	that	our	actions,	thoughts,	feelings,	and	movements	–	at	least	some	of	them	–	even	enter	into	consciousness	is	the	result	of	a	terrible	‘must’	which	has	ruled	over	man	for	a	long	time:	as	the	most	endangered	animal	he	needed	help	and	protection…he	had	to	express	his	neediness…and	to	do	so,	he	first	needed	‘consciousness’	(GS	354).		Therefore,	it	seems	to	be	the	case	that	Nietzsche	believes	that	the	need	for	communication	in	the	service	of	early	survival	is	what	gave	consciousness	its	linguistic	character.	Further,	this	linguistic	character	and	the	communicability	
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thereof,	in	turn,	solidified	the	herd	or	group	instinct	in	the	individual	at	the	cost	of	the	individuality	of	the	individual;	this	negative	transformation	of	orienting	to	the	herd	over	the	individual	is	why	Nietzsche	calls	consciousness	the	‘shallowest,’	‘worst,’	and	‘most	superficial’	aspect	of	the	self.	Finally,	the	inaccessibility	of	this	shallow,	linguistic	aspect	of	the	self	can	be	attributed	to	the	necessarily	conceptual	part	of	consciousness.		Consciousness	necessarily	has	conceptual	content	because	of	its	linguistic	character	and	unconscious	states	are	necessarily	inaccessible	to	conscious	states	precisely	because	conscious	states	have	this	linguistic-conceptual	aspect	and	unconscious	states	do	not;	the	inability	of	conscious	states	to	access	unconscious	states	suggests	consciousness	is	incomplete.				What	is	immediately	pressing	in	this	task	is	the	need	to	refine	our	understanding	of	the	term	‘contents.’	The	kind	of	content	belonging	to	a	mental	state	is,	according	to	Katsafanas,	made	up	of	simpler	concepts	and	structured	in	a	way	that	adequately	characterizes	the	content	itself.	This	entails	a	sort	of	necessity	for	a	familiarity,	so	to	speak,	with	the	concept	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	conceptual	content	in	a	mental	state.	The	relation	between	the	unconscious	and	the	conscious	satisfies	this	need	for	a	familiarity	with	a	conscious	concept	before	actually	becoming	conscious	of	the	concept.		Unconscious	perceptions,	which	are	
nonconceptual,	generate	and	constitute	our	conscious	concepts.	Strictly	speaking,	one	could	not	know	that	the	jacket	is	blue	if	one	lacked	the	concept	‘jacket’	or	‘blue.’	This	strict	conceptualization	of	the	perception	of	the	content	as	content	that	is	a	jacket,	which	is	blue,	is	not	present	in	our	unconscious	perception.	In	our	example,	one	can	
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unconsciously	and	nonconceptually	perceive	‘blue	jacket,’	however	the	person	perceiving	would	not	understand	that	what	she	is	perceiving	is	a	jacket,	and	all	that	entails	about	weather,	which	is	blue,	and	all	that	entails	about	the	length	of	light	waves.	The	content	in	unconscious	perception	is	the	same	as	that	in	conscious	perception,	but	the	content	is	represented	to	the	unconscious	as	nonconceptual,	or	pre-conceptualized	(and	by	implication,	necessarily	non-linguistic).		The	distinction	now	becomes	more	intelligible.	Conscious	states	have	conceptual	content	that	is	constituted	by	the	nonconceptual	content	of	unconscious	perception.	The	way	in	which	one	is	‘familiar’	with	a	concept	in	conscious	representation	before	actually	becoming	conscious	of	that	concept	is	just	to	say	that	concepts	represented	to	conscious	states	are	generated	by	nonconceptual	perceptions	in	unconscious	states.	Katsafanas	illustrates	the	distinction	that	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	how	unconscious	states	can	generate	yet	compete	with	conscious	states:	“And	Nietzsche’s	surprising	claim	is	this:	conscious	mental	states	have	conceptual	content,	whereas	unconscious	states	have	nonconceptual	content”	(NS	31).		Moving	forward,	in	order	to	move	even	closer	to	this	full	understanding	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	or	of	the	self	in	the	present,	we	shall	focus	on	the	second	philosopher	who	influenced	Nietzsche,	Immanuel	Kant.	To	summarize,	at	this	juncture,	we	have	called	attention	to	the	way	in	which	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	incorporates	a	Leibnizian	understanding	of	consciousness	as	being	constituted	by	petite	perceptions	in	unconsciousness	and	a	pseudo-Freudian	understanding	of	unconscious	states	being	distinct	from	and	
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inaccessible	to	conscious	states	in	virtue	of	the	latter’s	linguistic	determination.	We	have	also	illustrated	how	consciousness	should	be	identified	with	‘subject-multiplicity’	more	so	than	with	a	unified,	behind-the-scenes	Ego;	the	previous	two	assertions	suggest	that	consciousness	is	fragmented	or	at	least	not	unified.	The	linguistic	character	of	consciousness,	of	course,	is	what	characterizes	its	process	of	conceptualization;	this	suggests	that	consciousness	is	transformative.	Further,	we	have	suggested	that	consciousness	is	merely	an	accidental	quality	of	the	self	and	not	its	necessary	nor	its	demarking	quality	or	essence;	this	suggest	that	consciousness	is	incomplete.			
1.2	The	Kantian-Schopenhauerian	Connection:	Abstract	&	Concrete	Content,	Universal	
&	Individual	Content	Although	Nietzsche	aggressively	disagrees	with	Kant’s	assertions	about	things-in-themselves,	Kant’s	distinction	between	the	world	of	noumena	and	the	world	of	phenomena	is	an	initial	jumping	off	point	for	understanding	the	limited	roll	of	conscious	concepts	in	relation	to	the	totality	of	perception,	representation,	and	understanding.	Nietzsche’s	explication	of	the	utility	of	Kant’s	distinction	is	confusing	because	Nietzsche	typically	disagrees	with	all	of	Kant’s	ascetic	philosophical	tendencies	yet	in	this	instance	seems	to	be	praising	him.		It	is	also	confusing	because	Nietzsche	articulates	this	point	by	way	of	reference	to	Schopenhauer,	the	philosophy	of	whom	Nietzsche	also	has	a	love-hate	relationship.	Kant	wants	to	limit	
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the	realm	that	concepts	can	be	intelligible	in	by	questioning	causality.	Nietzsche	makes	the	following	observation:		Let	us	recall,	secondly,	Kant’s	colossal	question	mark	that	he	placed	on	the	concept	‘causality’….he	started	much	more	cautiously	to	delimit	the	realm	in	which	this	concept	makes	any	sense	whatsoever	(GS	357).		While	Schopenhauer	agreed	that	abstract	knowledge	involves	concepts,	he	asserted	that	perceptual	knowledge	is	nonconceptual.	Of	course,	these	two	types	of	knowledge	are	closely	linked;	abstract	knowledge	conceptualizes	insofar	as	it	takes	
nonconceptual	perceptions	and	makes	them	communicable,	transforms	them.	This	argument	is	derived	from	the	fact	that	both	man	and	animal	have	perceptual	knowledge	of	nonconceptual	content	as	well	as	the	more	important	fact	that	it	is	only	man	who	uniquely	has	abstract	knowledge	of	conceptual	content	insofar	as	it	is	only	man	who	has	language	as	such.		When	referring	to	the	word	consciousness	throughout	The	Gay	Science,	Nietzsche	uses	the	word	Bewußtheit	instead	of	Bewußtsein,	which	is	more	commonly	used,	because	the	former’s	suffix	(-heit)	typically	signifies	an	abstract	property	in	German	(GS	11).	Further,	Schopenhauer	extends	the	distinction	between	nonconceptual	and	conceptual	content	to	feelings	insofar	as	man	and	animal	can	have	the	same	feelings,	but	only	man	conceptualizes	these	feelings.	This	conceptualization	of	nonconceptual	perceptual	content	by	the	consciousness,	of	course,	manifests	as	conceptually	articulated	thinking	of	abstract	knowledge,	which,	
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for	Schopenhauer,	makes	the	existence	of	reflective	thinking	possible.	Not	only	does	this	make	reflective	thinking	possible,	it	has	important	implications	for	our	previous	discussion	on	the	linguistic	character	of	conceptual	thinking.	Further,	this	entails	a	very	important	and	new	distinction	between	concepts	as	abstract	and	non-individual	(universal)	and	perceptions	as	particular	(concrete)	and	individual.	Further	still,	this	means	that	consciously	represented	conceptual	content	is	not	made	up	of	individual	unconsciously	perceived	nonconceptual	content	since,	strictly	speaking,	abstract	concepts’	linguistic	character	cannot	have	introspective	awareness	of	nonlinguistic	nonconceptual	perception1.	In	order	to	fully	understand	how	the	self	in	the	present	is	characterized	by	the	relationship	of	unconscious	states	competing	with	yet	generating	conscious	states	even	though	conscious	states	cannot	have	introspective	awareness	to	unconscious	states,	we	must	further	elaborate	how	the	difference	between	abstract	universal	(non-individual)	perception	and	concrete	(particular)	Individual	perception	fits	into	the	conscious/unconscious	and	the	conceptual/nonconceptual	distinction,	respectively.	Consistent	with	the	clean	relationship	between	conscious/unconscious	and	conceptual/nonconceptual,	Nietzsche	thinks	that	perception	of	conceptual	content	is	conscious	and	perception	of	nonconceptual	content	is	unconscious.	This,	of	course,	entails	the	idea	that	perception	of	unconscious	nonconceptual	content	is	determinately	structured	and	has																																																									1	This	claim	of	the	impossibility	of	introspective	awareness	of	nonlinguistic	conceptual	perception	by	the	abstract	concept’s	linguistic	is	highly	controversial	and	by	no	means	proven.	However,	this	claim	is	introduced	for	three	reasons:	first,	to	be	
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determinate	content,	but	does	not	involve	concepts	as	previously	stated.	This	means	that	unconscious	content	is	nonconceptually	perceived,	but	not	linguistically	articulated.	As	Katsafanas	observes:	Unconscious	perceptions	have	conceptual	content,	in	the	sense	that	they	represent	their	objects	in	a	definite	way,	but	do	not	represent	them	as	instantiating	concepts;	conscious	perceptions	have	conceptual	content,	in	the	sense	that	they	represent	their	objects	as	instantiating	concepts	(NS	37).		All	of	this	is,	of	course,	consistent	with	the	concrete	and	individual	character	of	unconsciously	perceived	nonconceptual	content	illustrated	above.		So	what	would	an	unconscious	perception	that	is	concrete	and	individual	yet	is	not	conceptualized	look	like?	This	hinges	on	the	discriminatory	function	involved	in	this	unconscious	perception.	Katsafanas	notes	that	although	concepts	must	involve	discriminatory	abilities,	they	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	simple	discriminatory	faculty,	similar	to	how	reflection	is	the	product	of	conceptual	capacities,	which	must	involve	nonconceptual	perception,	but	is	not	reducible	to	it.	Katsafanas	elaborates	by	remarking	that	concepts	not	only	involve	discrimination,	but	also	involve	classification,	whereas	the	nonconceptual	does	not.	Katsafanas	illustrates	the	difference	between	discrimination	and	classification,	“concepts	are	systematically	related	to	other	concepts,	and	concepts	can	be	employed	in	non-perceptual	contexts…concepts	are	classificatory	capacities”	(NS	39).	Further,	this	type	of	conceptualization	involving	classification	can	be	abstract,	i.e.	take	place	in	non-
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perceptual	contexts.	Concept	possession	incorporates	discriminating	individual	instances	of	a	concept,	incorporates	relations	between	concepts,	and	incorporates	abstraction	when	concepts	are	not	present	to	perception.	Therefore,	concepts	get	their	abstract	and	universal	(non-individual)	character	from	nonconceptual	perceptions	(in	a	way	that	is	a-traditionally	causal),	through	the	conscious	classification	of	the	unconsciously	discriminated	concrete	and	individual	perceptions.	The	conscious	abstraction,	universalization,	and	classification	inherent	in	the	linguistic	conceptualization	of	non-conceptual	content	suggest	that	conscious	states	transform	the	content	of	unconscious	states.	So	now,	our	distinction	between	the	conceptual	nature	of	content	in	conscious	states	and	the	nonconceptual	nature	of	unconscious	states	is	more	refined.	By	way	of	Schopenhauer’s	critique	of	Kant’s	way	of	delimiting	of	content,	we	have	acquired	a	new	viewpoint	into	the	linguistic	character	of	conceptual	content	in	consciousness	and	its	implications	for	how	unconscious	states	can	compete	with	conscious	states.	In	addition,	also	by	way	of	Schopenhauer’s	critique	of	Kant’s	approach,	we	have	a	new	viewpoint	into	how	unconscious	states	can	constitute	conscious	states.	This	process	of	becoming,	this	illustration	of	how	conscious	conceptual	representation	is	abstract	and	how	concepts	are	universal	(non-individual)	as	well	as	how	unconscious	nonconceptual	perception	is	concrete	and	how	nonconceptual	perceptions	are	individual	further	refines	the	possibility	of	how	unconscious	states	can	compete	with	yet	generate	conscious	states	insofar	as	concepts	are	linguistic	and	universal	abstractions	(transformations)	of	concrete	and	
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individual	nonconceptual	perceptions.	Our	distinction	between	the	character	of	conscious	states	and	the	character	of	unconscious	states	not	only	refines	our	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	conscious	states	and	unconscious	states,	i.e.	the	latter	competes	with,	yet	generates	the	former.	It	also	illustrates	how	there	is	a	gap,	if	you	will,	between	what	is	present	in	conscious	states	and	what	is	present	in	unconscious	states;	at	the	very	least	we	can	say	that	competing	unconscious	states	cannot	be	wholly	unified	in	conscious	states	and	that	conscious	states	themselves	are	incomplete	in	some	way.	Now	we	turn	to	Hegel’s	great	philosophical	insight	on	the	nature	of	becoming	and	how	antonymous	(competing)	notions	generate	concepts	in	the	Nietzsche	text.			
1.3	The	Hegelian	Connection:	The	Becoming	of	Consciousness,	Antinomies	in	Nietzsche		 This	is	where	our	conversation	gets	interesting.	Our	nuanced	understanding	of	why	concepts	must	be	identified	with	conscious	states	and	not	with	unconscious	states	is	based	on	Hegel’s	understanding	of	how	concepts	develop	out	of	each	other.	Nietzsche	states:		We	Germans	are	Hegelians…insofar	as	we…instinctively	attribute	a	deeper	meaning	and	greater	value	to	becoming	and	development	than	to	what	‘is’…	and	also	insofar	as	we	are	not	inclined	to	concede	that	our	human	logic	is	logic	as	such	or	the	only	kind	of	logic	(we	would	rather	persuade	ourselves	that	it	is	only	a	special	case	and	perhaps	one	of	the	oddest	and	stupidest)	(GS	357).		
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Hegel’s	influence	on	German	philosophy	–	as	Nietzsche	understands	it,	the	emphasis	on	becoming	over	being	and	the	recognition	of	the	lack	of	the	all-encompassing	power	of	human	logic	–	manifests	itself	in	the	way	concepts	develop	out	of	each	other.		We	know	that	somehow	conscious	states	conceptualize	and	make	possible	for	communication	nonconceptual	content	in	unconscious	states	by	abstracting	and	universalizing	the	concrete	and	particular	perceptions	in	unconscious	states.		But	we	still	do	not	have	a	full	account	of	how	we	can	ascribe	a	competing	and	generating	character	to	this	process	of	becoming.			Paul	Katsafanas	sheds	light	here	by	appealing	to	a	Higher	Order	Theory	(HOT)	of	consciousness	in	a	way	that	does	justice	to	becoming	over	being	and	the	lack	of	an	all-encompassing	character	of	human	logic	(themes	which	have	further	implications	for	the	distorted	perspective	humans	create	for	themselves	in	history).	This	version	of	HOT	clarifies	how	conscious	states	are	conceptual	while	also	making	intelligible	how	unconscious	states	can	compete	with	yet	generate	conscious	states.	
If	nothing	else,	this	version	of	HOT	does	away	with	the	notion	that	consciousness	or	the	
self	in	the	present	is	some	unified	fixed	substance	that	is	infallible	(complete)	and	our	
grounds	for	accepting	reality	as	such.	Before	we	introduce	Katsafanas’s	version	of	HOT	for	these	purposes,	let	us	try	and	get	a	Nietzschean	sense	of	how	antimonies	can	compete	with	one	another	yet	be	unified	in	the	generation	of	a	singular	concept.	This	will	give	us	a	view	point	into	how	concepts	in	consciousness	as	well	as	consciousness	itself	is	a	useful	transformation	of	fragmented	and	competing	meanings	and	wills	that,	in	their	contrived	unification,	are	incomplete.	
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	 Nietzsche	has	a	special	place	in	his	heart	for	seeming	contradictions	that	are	actually	not	so	contradictory.	The	way	in	which	antimonies	relate	to	one	another	in	the	context	of	concepts	as	well	as	in	the	context	of	the	relationship	between	unconscious	states	and	conscious	states	significantly	helps	us	understand	the	becoming	(competing-generating)	of	concepts	and	conscious	states	in	a	way	that	transforms	one-sided	and	incomplete	meanings	and	wills	into	a	singular	meaning	or	will,	which	is	itself	somehow	incomplete	in	its	singularity.		First,	we	will	illustrate	this	point	in	the	context	of	conceptualization	and	then	in	the	context	of	the	becoming	of	consciousness.	Nietzsche	puts	the	general	point	as	follows:		All	of	us	harbor	in	ourselves	hidden	gardens	and	plantations…we	are	all	growing	volcanoes	approaching	their	hour	of	eruption	(GS	9).		This	is	to	say	that	our	hidden	gardens	somehow	erupt	to	the	surface	of	our	being.	Less	metaphorically,	Nietzsche	discusses	how	our	concept	of	displeasure	is	intimately	related	to	our	concept	of	pleasure	and	that	our	concept	of	pleasure	without	displeasure	is	inauthentic	or	false.		Pleasure	and	displeasure	are	so	intertwined	that	whoever	wants	as	much	as	possible	of	one	must	also	have	as	much	as	possible	of	the	other	(GS	12).		It	should	be	stated	that	the	way	in	which	our	concept	of	pleasure	is	intimately	intertwined	with	our	concept	of	displeasure	to	such	an	extent	that	it	is	impossible	to	have	one	without	the	other,	mimics	the	way,	and	one	could	even	argue	is	grounded	in	the	way,	in	which	conscious	states	are	intimately	intertwined	with	unconscious	
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states	to	such	an	extent	that	it	is	impossible	to	have	one	without	the	other.	In	a	sense,	one	could	say	that	our	concept	of	displeasure	competes	with	pleasure,	since	they	are	antonymous	in	definition,	yet	also	generates	our	or	transforms	into	our	singular	concept	of	pleasure,	because	of	how	it	is	impossible	to	have	pleasure	without	displeasure.	This	is	clearly	similar	to	the	way	in	which	unconscious	states	compete	with	yet	generate	conscious	sates.		Nietzsche	applies	this	general	idea	of	how	antimonies	actually	constitute	a	singular	concept	to	the	concept	of	benevolence.		 	We	benefit	and	show	benevolence	towards	those	who	already	depend	on	us	in	some	way…we	want	to	increase	their	power	because	we	thus	increase	our	own	(GS	13).		This	counterintuitive	conception	of	benevolence	involving	self-interest	in	increasing	one’s	power	(which	is	typically	left	out	of	the	conception	of	benevolence)	is	consistent	with	this	overall	theme	of	competing	senses	generating	singular	concepts	and	is	a	nice	way	of	understanding	how	unconscious	states	can	possibly	compete	with	yet	generate	conscious	states.	If	you	think	that	we	should	not	get	our	sense	of	consciousness	from	off-hand	remarks	about	concepts,	consider	the	continual	commitment	to	this	view	of	antinomies	and	their	generating	nature.		As	Nietzsche	remarks,	continuing	this	same	theme:		Yes	that	this	love	has	furnished	the	concept	of	love	as	the	opposite	of	egoism	when	it	may	in	fact	be	the	most	candid	expression	of	egoism	(GS	14).		
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The	way	in	which	the	concepts	of	pleasure,	benevolence,	and	love	are	all	generated	out	of	their	seemingly	antonymous	(or	‘competing’	for	our	purposes)	counterparts	clearly	parallels	the	way	in	which	unconscious	states	compete	with	yet	generate	conscious	states.	Nietzsche	also	illustrates	how	this	process	works.	Clearly,	these	antinomies	do	not	unify	themselves.	Instead,	it	is	a	process	of	conceptual	re-interpretation,	a	point	that	has	an	important	bearing	on	the	next	sections	of	this	thesis.	Nietzsche	states	this	process,	in	the	context	of	virtues,	when	he	observes:		There	is	clearly	no	trick	that	enables	us	to	turn	a	poor	virtue	into	a	rich	and	overflowing	one,	but	we	can	surely	reinterpret	its	poverty	nicely	into	a	necessity,	so	that	its	sight	no	longer	offends	us	(GS	17).		He	sees	this	sort	of	process	at	work	across	the	virtues.	Ask	yourself	whether…any	misfortune	and	external	resistance,	whether	any	kinds	of	hatred,	jealousy,	stubbornness,	mistrust,	hardness,	greed,	and	violence	do	not	belong	to	the	favourable	conditions	without	which	any	great	growth	even	of	virtue	is	scarcely	possible	(GS	19).			
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This	theme	continues	ad	nauseam,	as	Nietzsche	finds	this	process	at	work	in	our	conceptions	of	prudence,	selflessness,	violence,	generosity,	laughter,	nobility,	punishment,	and	faithfulness.2			There	is	an	obvious	theme	at	play	here.	Nietzsche	thinks	that	most	of	our	concepts	(in	consciousness)	are	not	unified	concepts,	but	concepts	that	are	generated	by	unreconciled	oppositions	or	competing	antinomies;	one-sided	antimonies	are	transformed	into	a	singular	meaning.	While	this	non-formal	understanding	of	the	unreconciled	contradictions	at	play	in	concepts	is	slightly	different	from	the	hard	line	in	the	sand	that	we	previously	drew	about	individual	concrete	unconscious	perceptions	competing	with	and	generating	universal	abstract	concepts,	the	sense	of	the	former	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	while	continuing	to	generate	our	understanding	of	the	latter	and	how	it	has	manifested	itself	in	history.		Before	delving	into	Katsafanas’s	conclusion	about	how	this	competing	and	generating	becoming	manifests	itself	in	the	present,	let	us	briefly	look	at	what	Nietzsche	himself	says	about	the	unreconciled	character	of	consciousness.	Nietzsche	
																																																								2	See	his	remarks	about	prudence	(“Everything	men	will	do	will	display	the	highest	prudence:	But	just	that	way	prudence	will	lose	all	its	dignity”(GS	20,));	selflessness	(“…the	neighbor	praises	selflessness	because	it	brings	him	advantage…and	above	all	he	would	affirm	his	selflessness	by	not	calling	it	good…the	motives	to	this	morality	stand	in	opposition	to	its	principle…and	thus	one	preaches,	in	the	same	breath,	a	‘Thou	shalt’	and	a	‘Thou	shalt	not’	(GS	21));	violence	(“when	individuals	had	to	protect	themselves	against	violence	and	to	that	end	had	themselves	to	become	men	of	violence”	(GS	48));	generosity	(“with	the	rich,	generosity	is	often	just	a	type	of	shyness”	(GS	199)	laughter	(“laughter	means:	to	gloat,	but	with	a	good	conscience	”	(GS	200);	nobility	(“You	envisage	a	noble	ideal…isn’t	all	your	work	a	barbarous	sculpting?	A	blasphemy	against	your	ideal”	(GS	215);	punishment	(“the	purpose	of	punishment	is	to	improve	the	one	who	punishes”	(GS	));	and	
faithfulness	(“from	defiance	he	clings	to	something	he	has	come	to	see	through,	but	he	calls	it	‘faithfulness’”	(GS	219)).	
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illustrates	how	consciousness	is	itself	not	unified	by	comparing	the	wills	of	consciousness	to	constantly	and	rapidly	crashing	waves.		How	greedily	this	wave	is	approaching…but	already	another	wave	is	nearing,	still	more	greedily	and	wildly	than	the	first…that	is	how	the	waves	live	–	that	is	how	we	live,	we	who	
will	–	I	will	say	no	more	(GS	310).		Further,	in	GS	317,	Nietzsche	confesses	that	he	thought	the	fixed	conception	of	his	self	was	a	lasting	state	of	character,	when	in	reality	it	is	a	multiplicity	of	temporary	states	of	being	affected.		When	critiquing	Spinoza’s	conception	of	knowledge,	Nietzsche	discusses	how	consciousness	has	to	make	sense	of	un-reconciled	one-sided	wills	or	antimonies	in	our	language.	In	aphorism	333,	Nietzsche	just	happens	to	single	out	the	examples	of	laughter,	lamenting,	and	cursing.	But	this	way	of	making	sense	of	un-reconciled	one-sided	antimonies	is	not	limited	to	the	aforementioned	impulses.	As	he	puts	it,		Before	knowledge	is	possible,	each	of	these	impulses	must	first	have	presented	its	one-sided	view	of	the	thing	or	event,	then	comes	the	fight	between	these	one-sided	views,	and	occasionally	out	of	it	a	mean,	an	appeasement,	a	concession	to	all	three	sides	(GS	333).		Nietzsche	summarizes	the	meaning	of	this	one-sided	fight	for	conscious	conceptual	knowing	and	the	transformative	supposition	accompanying	it.		
	25			
We	suppose	that	intelligere	must	be	something	conciliatory,	just,	and	good,	something	essentially	opposed	to	its	instincts,	when	in	fact	it	is	only	a	certain	behavior	of	the	drives	towards	
one	another…Conscious	thought…is	the	least	vigorous	and	therefore	also	the	relatively	mildest	and	calmest	type	of	thought	(GS	333).		Clearly,	Nietzsche	does	not	only	remark,	in	passing,	that	some	of	our	concepts	in	consciousness	are	not	singular	and	unified	but	are	instead	generated	by	competing	or	antonymous	meanings,	but	he	also	clearly	asserts	that	consciousness	itself	is	not	singular	and	unified	and	is	instead	a	state	of	being	affected	by	unreconciled	and	one-sided	antonymous	wills.		Therefore	at	this	juncture,	our	investigation	into	the	process	of	becoming,	of	the	antonymous	meanings	present	in	a	singular	concept,	and	the	antonymous	wills	present	in	a	singular	conscious	state	suggests	that	consciousness	is	not	unified	and	is	transformative;	of	course,	in	light	of	the	totality	of	our	discussion	we	can	also	suggest	that	consciousness	is	incomplete.		
1.4	The	Higher	Order	Theory	of	Consciousness	It	should	now	be	clear,	not	only	how	concepts	involve	seemingly	contradictory	meanings,	but	also	how	consciousness	itself	is	the	result	of	or	is	generated	by	competing	unconscious	wills	–	and,	indeed,	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	the	parallel	distinctions,	drawn	earlier,	between	conceptual	and	nonconceptual,	linguistic	and	a-linguistic,	abstract	and	concrete,	universal	and	
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individual,	reflective	and	non	reflective,	and	classificatory	and	merely	discriminatory	contents.	Before	formally	delving	into	the	perspectival	and	transformative	nature	of	consciousness,	let’s	review	Katsafanas’s	formal	conception	of	how	to	understand	the	becoming	of	consciousness,	the	competing	and	generating	nature	of	the	relationship	between	unconscious	states	and	conscious	states.	The	Higher	Order	Theory	of	consciousness	(HOT)	supports	that	mental	states	are	conscious	if	and	only	if	the	organism	has	a	non-inferential	higher	order	representation	with	the	content	of	the	mental	state.	Partly	due	to	the	fact	that	higher-order	states	are	typically	unconscious,	the	presence	of	a	second-order	state	brings	about	a	first	order	state	of	consciousness	where	one	of	the	two	present	unconscious	states	make	the	other	its	object.		This	doubling	or	mirroring	of	mental	states	turning	two	unconscious	states	into	one	conscious	state	could	be	viewed	as	rendering	the	conscious/unconscious	and	conceptual/nonconceptual	distinctions	false,	however	Katsafanas	rejects	this	conclusion.	Katsafanas	endorses	a	version	of	the	HOT	theory	that	incorporates	the	higher-order	thought	into	the	conscious	state	and	not	just	the	conscious-making	state,	focusing	on	the	becoming	conscious	and	not	merely	on	the	being	conscious.	Katsafanas	states,	“The	conscious	state	is	a	composite	state,	which	includes	both	the	meta-thought	and	the	original	unconscious	state”	(NS	46).	This,	as	Gennaro	notes,	entails	that	conscious	states	contain	a	world-directed	mental	state	and	a	metapsychological	thought	(NS	46).	Therefore	this	model	not	only	accounts	for	the	conscious	state	as	partially	conceptual,	but	it	also	accounts	for	how	unconscious	states	are	actually	transformed	by	the	higher-order	
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thought,	not	merely	brought	into	awareness.	This	HOT	theory	that	accounts	for	Nietzsche’s	adoption	of	the	conscious/unconscious	and	conceptual/nonconceptual	distinctions	is	also	consistent	with	Nietzsche’s	assertions	that	the	conceptual	framework	in	conscious	states	is	contingent	and	historically	changeable,	the	metapsychological	thought	is	world-directed.	Of	course,	what	is	valuable	is	contingent	to	or	dependent	on	the	historical	situation	one	finds	oneself	in.	Katsafanas	concludes,	“Conscious	mental	states	are	those	with	conceptual	content,	whereas	unconscious	mental	states	are	those	with	nonconceptual	content.	States	with	conceptual	content	are	introspectively	assessable	and	communicable,	whereas	states	with	nonconceptual	content	are	not”	(NS	51).	This	illustrates	how	concepts	in	the	consciousness	do	not	directly	refer	to	the	contents	of	experience.		Instead	they	
refer	to	a	valuable	transformation	of	the	contents	of	experience;	this	further	suggests	that	consciousness	is	incomplete	in	virtue	of,	but	not	limited	to,	this	transformation	and	the	lack	of	direct	reference	to	the	contents	of	experience.	This	way	of	explicating	how	unconscious	states	can	constitute	yet	compete	with	conscious	states	is	consistent	with	Hegel’s	cryptic	assertion	that	concepts	develop	out	of	each	other.		It	also	is	consistent	with	our	distinction	between	the	refined	natures	of	conscious	concepts	and	unconscious	concepts	and	the	implications	for	the	relations.	The	result	of	the	foregoing	considerations	is	a	very	specific	understanding	of	the	German	philosophical	tradition’s	influence	on	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind.	Thus	far,	we	have	shown,	in	1.1	that	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	reconciles	Leibniz’s	conscious/unconscious	distinction,	the	pseudo-Freudian	
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concept/nonconceptual	distinction,	the	implication	of	the	(im)possibility	of	linguistic	articulation,	introspective	awareness	for	the	conceptual	content	in	consciousness	and	the	nonconceptual	content	in	unconsciousness,	and	an	understanding	of	consciousness	as	inessential	and	as	subject-multiplicity.	This	suggests	that	conscious	states	are	fragmented	or	not	unified	and	incomplete.	Further,	in	1.2	we	have	shown	how	Leibniz’s	understanding	of	how	unconscious	states	underlie	conscious	states	is	reconciled	with	Schopenhauer’s	refinement	of	Kant’s	understanding	of	the	delimited	role	of	conscious	concepts	through	the	linguistic	and	reflective	classification	of	the	unconscious	discrimination	of	individual	and	concrete	nonconceptual	perceptions	as	abstract,	universal	(non-individual)	conceptual	representation	in	conscious	states	in	the	Nietzschean	system.	This	suggests	that	conscious	states	are	transformative	in	their	linguistic	determination.	In	1.3,	we	have	shown	how	Hegel’s	assertion	that	concepts	develop	out	of	each	other	is	consistent	with	Nietzsche’s	illustration	of	how	concepts	are	made	up	of	many	antonymous	one-sided	senses	of	said	concept.	This	suggests	that	conscious	states	are	singular	instances	of	multiple	competing	wills,	which	are	not	fully	reconciled.		1.4,	we	have	shown	how	Katsafanas’s	HOT	of	consciousness	makes	sense	of	Hegel’s	emphasis	on	becoming	by	accounting	for	the	creation	of	conscious	concepts	in	conscious	states	out	of	the	interaction	between	and	transformation	of	unconscious	world	direct	mental	states	and	metapsychological	thoughts,	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	our	previous	conceptual/conscious	and	nonconceptual/unconscious	refined	set	of	distinctions	as	well	as	in	a	way	that	grounds	how	unconscious	states	
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can	generate	yet	compete	with	conscious	states.	This	suggests,	of	course,	that	consciousness	is	transformative	in	its	world	orientation.	In	reflecting	on	the	totality	of	these	influences,	we	can	state	that,	at	the	very	least,	consciousness	is	not	unified	and	does	not	explicitly	account	for	the	totality	of	perception	of	the	phenomenological	world.	The	strongest	argument	for	the	fragmented,	incomplete,	and	transformative	character	of	consciousness	is	the	fragmented	nature	of	how	antonymous	wills	are	present	in	one	conscious	state	and	the	linguistic	determination	necessary	to	and	inherent	in	the	logicizing	of	perception.	Even	if	the	strength	of	our	aforementioned	distinctions	begin	to	weaken	upon	scrutiny,	we	can	at	least	say	that	the	distinctions	are	a	useful	tool	in	illustrating	the	presence	of	antonymous	wills	within	one	will	or	of	antonymous	conceptual	meanings	within	one	concept	that	allows	us	to	get	a	sense	of	the	competing-generating	nature	of	the	process	of	becoming.	Even	if	the	distinction	falls	apart,	the	presence	of	differences	in	a	singular	concept	is	a	useful	exercise	in	gaining	a	good	conscience	towards	our	new	conception	of	consciousness	as	perspectival	(fragmented	and	incomplete)	and	transforming	(distortive	in	its	historical	instantiation).	The	fragmented	and	incomplete	character	of	consciousness	and	the	useful	simplification	of	conceptualizing	in	consciousness	(the	‘contrived	and	fixed’	end	of	the	process	of	becoming)	suggest	that	consciousness	is	merely	perspectival.	This	created	perspective,	if	you	will,	suggests	that	the	transformative	character	of	consciousness	is	opened	up	to	the	possibility	of	distortion	in	its	historical	instantiation.		
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1.5	The	Perspectival	Character	of	Consciousness	Nietzsche	thinks	that	while	concepts	are	determined	by	what	is	common,	insofar	as	concepts	are	communicable,	we	do	not	share	concepts,	strictly,	with	other	individuals.	Crudely	put,	Nietzsche’s	theory	of	perspectivism	states	that	concepts	are	unique	to	each	individual	in	question.		The	material	of	the	senses	organized	by	the	understanding,	reduced	to	rough	outlines…Thus,	the	indistinctness	and	chaos	of	sense	impressions	as	it	were	logicized…the	world	of	‘phenomena’	[and]	is	the	organized	world	which	we	see	to	be	real.	The	‘reality’	lies	in	the…recurrence	of	the	like,	familiar,	related	things	in	their	logicized	character.		(WP	569)	Similarly,	he	exclaims:	“As	if	a	world	would	still	remain	over	after	one	had	subtracted	the	perspective!’		(WP	567).	Clearly,	Nietzsche	thinks	that	an	individual’s	perspective	always	characterizes	the	way	in	which	the	person	conceptualizes.		This	assertion	goes	hand	in	hand	with	Nietzsche’s	talk	of	utility	in	the	context	of	how	concepts	arise.	Katsafanas	notes	that	even	if	we	could	refine	our	concepts	to	be	extremely	specific,	“it	wouldn’t	matter.	For	the	way	in	which	various	unconscious	contents	become	conscious	will	depend	upon	the	perspective	(i.e.	system	of	concepts)	that	the	agent	employs;	but	there	are	no	independent	standards	for	determining	which	of	these	perspectives	is	best”	(NS	57).		The	upshot	is	that	there	are	many	different,	incompatible	ways	of	conceptualizing	the	nonconceptual	content	of	unconscious	perception,	even	though	
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the	process	(along	with	the	linguistically	determined	character	of	conceptualization)	is	common	to	all.		Nietzsche	himself	discusses	the	thoroughly	perspectival	character	of	our	conscious	states.	“For	him,	an	individual	is	always	an	individual,	something	first	and	last	and	tremendous;	for	him	there	are	no	species,	sums,	or	zeroes”	(GS	1).	Indeed,	Nietzsche	goes	even	further	when	he	claims:		Egoism	is	the	perspectival	law	of	feeling	according	to	which	what	is	closest	appears	large	and	heavy,	while	in	the	distance	everything	decreases	in	size	and	weight”(GS	162).		Further,	Nietzsche	states,	casually,	how	the	law	of	perspectivism	manifests	in	nature,	“the	sacrificial	animal	thinks	differently	about	sacrifice	than	the	spectator”	and	“’Our	eyes	are	also	intended	for	hearing’,	said	the	old	father	confessor	who	had	gone	deaf,	‘and	among	the	blind	he	is	king	who	has	the	longest	ears’”	(GS	220,	223).		Of	course,	this	perspectival	aspect	involved	in	all	conscious	conceptualization	of	unconsciously	perceived	nonconceptual	content	is	what	makes	‘maximally	specific’	concepts	impossible	in	the	Nietzschean	philosophy	of	mind.	Concepts	that	are	strictly	and	‘scientifically’	specific	are	not	only	not	the	most	useful	concepts,	but	they	also	would	never	be	objectively	specific,	because,	although	they	would	be	linguistically	communicable	and	therefore	common	in	a	sense,	they	would	also	always	be	referring	back	to	or	would	be	constituted	by	a	subjective	perspective.		The	world	and	the	concept	are	the	most	manifest	ground	for	our	belief…through	words	and	concepts	we	are	still	continually	misled	into	imagining	things	as	being	simpler	than	they	are…each	existing	in	
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and	for	itself.	A	philosophical	mythology	lies	concealed	in	language	(WS	11;	cf.	HH	I.11).		The	multiplicity	of	perspectival	conceptualizations	that	each	accurately	account	for	conscious	experience,	dare	one	say	‘truths,’	is	Nietzsche’s	jumping	off	point	for	claiming	that	consciousness’s	perspectival	and	transformative	character	is	distortive	in	its	historical	instantiation.	
1.6	The	Transformative	Distortion	of	Consciousness	The	final	part	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	to	be	considered	is	his	claim	that	consciousness	is	essentially	superficial,	falsifying,	and	dangerous;	this	is	to	say	that	consciousness	historically	distorts.	Consciousness	is	inherently	perspectival	(fragmented,	incomplete,	competing)	as	well	as	inherently	transformative	in	its	becoming	(linguistic	determination,	world-direction	of	HOT,	generating).	The	perspectival	and	transformative	aspect	of	consciousness	gains	a	distorting	character	when	we	look	at	how	this	perspectival	transformation	has	played	out	in	the	theater	of	history.	Here,	again,	Katsafanas	shows	the	way	by	illustrating	Nietzsche’s	assertions	that	only	part	of	the	content	in	unconscious	states	is	apprehended	in	conscious	states	and	that	through	transformative	interaction	with	conscious	states,	unconscious	states	are	altered	in	conscious	thought.	Katsafanas	begins	this	discussion	of	the	superficiality	of	consciousness	by	illustrating	that	the	content	of	our	unconscious	states	do	not	make	it	all	the	way	up	to,	so	to	speak,	our	conscious	states	and	by	asserting	that	the	process	of	conceptualization	is	not	fixed.	As	Nietzsche	puts	it:		
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Due	to	the	nature	of	animal	consciousness,	the	world	of	which	we	can	become	conscious	is	merely	a	surface-	and	sign-world…all	becoming	conscious	involves	a	vast	and	thorough	corruption,	falsification,	superficialization,	and	generalization	(GS	354).		Clearly	the	mere	surface	and	sign	nature	assigned	to	the	world	known	by	consciousness	is	corrupted,	falsified,	superficialized,	generalized	insofar	as	the	world	known	to	the	unconscious	is	outside	of	the	scope	of	the	conscious	and	is	made	intelligible	to	the	consciousness	in	a	way	that	transforms.	Since	conscious	perception	cannot	account	for	all	of	the	detail	contained	within	the	unconscious	perception,	“[unconscious]	experience	outstrips	our	[conscious]	conceptual	recourses”	(NS	53).		It	should	be	noted	that	conceptual	knowledge	does	not	mean	knowledge	containing	more	detail.	When	the	conscious	states	superimpose	conceptual	knowledge	on	nonconceptual	unconscious	perception,	more	knowledge	does	not	exist,	one	could	say.	While	conceptualization	is	a	creation	or	transformation,	so	to	speak,	it	is	one	that	generalizes	and	simplifies	the	nonconceptual	perception	of	the	unconscious	so	as	to	make	it	useful	for	consciousness.		Nonconceptual	content	is	useful	for	consciousness	insofar	as	it	is	dumbed	down	to	the	shared	aspect	of	the	perception	that	makes	it	linguistically	communicable	and	intelligible.	Katsafanas	notes	that	Schopenhauer	endorses	a	similar	claim	about	unconscious	nonconceptual	content	exceeding	the	conscious	conceptual	knowledge	thereof.	Schopenhauer	states,	“Abstract	rational	knowledge	is…by	no	means	so	congruent	with	
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[representation	from	perception]	that	it	could	everywhere	take	its	place;	on	the	contrary,	it	never	corresponds	wholly	to	this	representation”	(WWR	I,	13).		This	lack	of	correspondence,	of	course,	limits	conscious	conceptual	knowledge	–	this,	however,	is	not	consciousness’s	only	handicap.		Concepts	arise,	as	Katsafanas	notes,	out	of	the	need	to	communicate	and	they,	accordingly,	have	a	linguistic	character,	which	is	the	therefore	the	end	of	consciousness.		This	end	stands	opposed	to	the	notion	that	the	purpose	of	consciousness	is	to	accurately	describe	the	totality	of	unconscious	nonconceptual	perception,	which	it	obviously	is	not.		Unconscious	perception	of	nonconceptual	content	surpasses	our	conscious	conceptual	framework	because	of	the	general	character	of	concepts	or	the	
simplification	inherent	in	generalization	of	conceptualization.	Just	as	conceptualization	arose	with	the	need	to	communicate,	conceptualization	is	always	driven	by	practical	concerns,	specifically	a	social	one,	to	communicate.	Remember,	Nietzsche	states,	“consciousness	in	general	has	developed	under	the	pressure	of	the	
need	for	communication…and	it	developed	only	in	proportion	to	the	degree	of	its	utility	(GS	354).	Katsafanas	argues	that	our	conscious	conceptualization	arose	out	of	a	need	to	communicate	and	therefore	only	gained	concepts	that	fulfilled	the	function	of	conceptualizing	perceptions	that	needed	to	be	linguistically	communicated	to	others.	Clearly,	in	the	early	ages	of	society,	collaboration	was	necessary	to	survival	and	the	particulars	of	the	need	for	that	collaboration	constituted	the	concepts	created	by	the	consciousness.	Katsafanas	illustrates	how	the	conditions	in	which	
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communicative	needs	arose	are	at	odds	with	the	type	of	clarity	typically	ascribed	to	consciousness	by	philosophers	and	scientists,	which	grounds	the	distortion	claim.		[I]n	engaging	in	these	sorts	of	activities	[planning,	mutual	aid,	et		cetera],	one	needs	to	communicate	quickly	and	efficiently.	Hesitation	and	the	transmission	of	excessive	amounts	of	information	hinders	these	sorts	of	activities	(cf.	GS	111)….the	need	for	speed	and	efficiency	cut	against	the	desire	for	maximal	accuracy	and	specificity	[of	philosophers	and	scientists]	(NS	55).		Clearly,	concept	acquisition	is	pragmatic	insofar	as	it	is	useful	to	the	individual	who	substantiates	the	concept,	so	to	speak.	Rarely	in	the	early	forms	of	conceptualization,	which	has,	for	better	or	for	worse,	cemented	many	of	our	modern	conceptions	or	has,	at	least,	linguistically	determined	them,	was	there	a	need	for	clear,	thorough	explication.	Almost	exclusively,	the	needs	that	constituted	our	conceptions	were	needs	for	a	society	to	communicate	in	order	to	survive	or	needs	for	a	group	of	individuals	to	gain	power	over	others,	in	order	to	survive	better	than	others.		Katsafanas	notes	that	the	general	character	of	concepts	is	necessary	in	both	Schopenhauer’s	and	Nietzsche’s	conception	of	concepts.	Schopenhauer	asserts	that	concepts	are	general	insofar	as	they	are	common	and	universal,	which	Nietzsche	iterates	when	he	observes	that	“’to	know	ourselves’,	will	always	bring	to	consciousness	precisely	that	in	ourselves	which	is	‘non-individual,’	that	which	is	average”		(WWR	I,	8-10	/	GS	354).	As	Katsafanas	notes,	the	general	nature	of	
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concepts	entails	that	consciousness	itself	is	characterized	by	what	is	linguistically	communicable,	by	what	is	common,	and	by	what	is	general.	However,	the	transformation	that	takes	place	in	the	process	of	becoming	conscious	is	not	limited	to	the	superficial,	abstract,	and	linguistic	character	thereof.	Let	us	return	to	The	Gay	Science	to	understand	what	Nietzsche	says	about	the	perspectival	(fragmented,	incomplete,	and	simplified)	nature	of	consciousness	himself	and	then	return	to	The	Nietzschean	Self	in	order	to	formalize	(and	distort!)	our	conception	of	the	transformation	that	takes	place	in	the	perspectival	becoming	of	consciousness.		Nietzsche	speaks	generally	about	our	conscious	logicizing	of	nonconceptual	perceptions	into	concepts	in	a	way	that	transforms	the	original	perception.		To	this	end	he	[man]	invents	a	second,	different	existence	and	takes	by	means	of	his	new	mechanics	the	old,	ordinary	existence	off	its	old	ordinary	hinges”	(GS	1)	And,	in	the	context	of	how	we	place	purpose	onto	our	insignificant	lives,	Human	nature	on	the	whole	has	surely	been	altered	by	the	recurring	emergence	of	such	teachers	of	the	purpose	of	existence	(GS	1).		In	aphorism	11,	entitled	Consciousness,	Nietzsche	repeatedly	discusses	the	transformative	nature	of	the	namesake	of	the	aphorism	in	a	negative	light.		Consciousness	gives	rise	to	countless	mistakes…Humanity	would		have	to	perish	with	open	eyes	of	its	misjudging	and	its	fantasizing	of	its	lack	of	thoroughness	and	its	incredulity	–	in	short	of	its	
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consciousness….	It	is	only	beginning	to	dawn	on	the	human	eye	and	is	yet	barely	discernible…that	so	far	we	have	incorporated	only	our	errors	and	that	all	of	our	consciousness	refers	to	our	errors!	(GS	11)	Nietzsche	even	goes	so	far	as	to	mock	the	people	who	think	that	consciousness	is	a	fixed	and	infallible	unity	instead	of	useful	construction	generated	by	competing	unconscious	wills.		One	thinks	it	[consciousness]	is	the	kernel	of	man,	what	is	abiding,	eternal,	ultimate,	most	original	in	him…Sees	it	as	‘the	unity	of	the	organism’!	This	ridiculous	overestimation	and	misapprehension	of	consciousness	has	the	very	useful	consequence	that	an	all-too-rapid	development	of	consciousness	was	prevented	(GS	11).		Clearly,	Nietzsche	does	not	consider	consciousness	as	the	unification	of	or	the	essence	of	man,	but	he	also	does	not	think	that	the	development	of	our	understanding	of	consciousness	as	such	is	without	some	utility.		Nietzsche	continues	his	crusade	of	illustrating	the	distorting	nature	of	consciousness	while	also	preserving	the	usefulness	of	understanding	consciousness	in	this	less	‘accurate’	way.		The	insight	into	general	untruth	and	mendacity	that	is	now	given	to	us	by	science	–	the	insight	into	delusion	and	error	as	a	condition	of	cognitive	and	sensate	existence	–	would	be	utterly	unbearable	(GS	107).		
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Here,	Nietzsche	is	stating	that	knowledge	of	the	thoroughly	perspectival,	in	its	incompleteness,	and	transformative,	in	its	linguistic	simplification,	character	of	consciousness	would	be	‘utterly	unbearable’	in	a	way,	which	is	to	say	that	Nietzsche	understands	why	we	have	not	expressively	discussed	this	nature	of	consciousness	hitherto.		The	exact	reasons	for	this	fact	are	taken	up	in	our	discussion	of	history.		Through	immense	periods	of	time,	the	intellect	produced	nothing	but	errors;	some	of	them	turned	out	to	be	useful	and	species-preserving…thus	the	strength	of	knowledge	lies	not	it	its	degree	of	truth,	but	in	its	character	as	a	condition	of	life”	and,	“What,	then,	are	man’s	truths	ultimately?	–	They	are	the	irrefutable	errors	of	man	(GS	110,	265).		Clearly,	the	transformation	(not	limited	to,	but	characterized	by	the	linguistic	simplification	of	nonconceptual	content	in	perception)	of	the	reality	in	consciousness	has	its	ground	in	the	utility	of	its	errors.	Nietzsche	goes	on,	“What	is	the	origin	of	logic	[logicizing,	linguistic	simplification]	in	man’s	head?	Surely	it	arose	out	of	the	illogical”	and,	“Man	has	been	educated	by	his	errors:	first,	he	saw	himself	only	incompletely,	secondly,	he	endowed	himself	with	fictitious	attributes”	(GS	111,	114).	These	instances	of	Nietzsche	seemingly	putting	‘our	errors’	and	‘the	illogical’	on	the	pedestal	that	philosophers	usually	reserve	for	‘Consciousness,’	‘Reason,’	‘Truth,’	‘Rationality,’	and	‘Logic’	is	a	rhetorical	tool	meant	to	bring	to	mind	this	exact	juxtaposition.	What	Nietzsche	means	to	illustrate	is	that	when	philosophers	(and	people	in	general)	posit	‘Consciousness,’	‘Reason,’	‘Truth,’	‘Rationality,’	and	‘Logic’	as	
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the	alpha	and	omega	of	human	nature	and	essence	what	we	are	really	doing	is	positing	‘our	errors’	and	‘the	illogical’	as	the	alpha	and	omega	of	human	nature	and	essence	without	knowing	it.	Clearly,	as	demonstrated	by	the	entirety	of	our	above	discussion,	the	concepts	that	we	typically	posit	as	the	essence	of	humanity	are	actually	indebted	to	and	formed	out	of	their	antonymous	concepts.	However,	instead	of	systematically	illustrating	the	importance	of	the	unconscious	for	the	conscious,	of	unreason	for	reason,	of	untruth	for	truth,	of	irrationality	for	rationality,	and	of	the	illogical	for	the	logical,	Nietzsche	instead	chooses	to	cleverly	and	impolitely	admonish	those	who	think	otherwise.	The	error	of	incompletion,	consisting	of	overtly	identifying	oneself	with	conscious	states	and	these	fictitious	attributes,	is	the	supposed	‘fixed’	and	‘unified’	character	of	consciousness.	Nietzsche	also	makes	this	point	by	pointing	out	the	etymological	relation	between	the	Latin	word	‘mentiri’	meaning	‘to	lie’	with	the	Latin	words	‘mens’	and	‘memini’	meaning	‘mind’	and	‘to	remember,’	respectively,	in	GS	157.	Further,	Nietzsche	asserts	the	distortion	principle	indirectly,	but	succinctly,	“Thoughts	are	the	shadows	of	our	sensations	–	always	darker,	emptier,	simpler”	and,	“He	is	a	thinker:	that	means	he	knows	how	to	make	things	simpler	than	they	are”	(GS	179,	189	emphasis	added).	Clearly,	Nietzsche	is	attributing	a	simplifying	character	to	thoughts	and	the	activity	of	thinking,	and	he	is	contending	that	this	simplifying	requires	us	to	identify	consciousness	with	distortion.		At	this	juncture,	we	have	given	an	account	of	the	perspectival	and	transformative	nature	of	consciousness,	which	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to	its	
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superficiality,	its	abstracting,	its	linguistically	simplifying,	its	classifying	and	logicizing,	its	species-preserving	errors,	its	world-directed	transformative,	and	its	perspectival	nature.	However,	before	finally	returning	to	the	Katsafanas,	we	must	make	an	important	note.	The	perspectival	(fragmented	and	incomplete)	character	of	consciousness	and	its	transformative	nature,	in	virtue	of	its	linguistic	determination,	is	itself	transformed,	in	a	sense,	into	a	distorting	nature	when	it	is	instantiated	over	the	course	of	history.	However,	this	distorted	instantiation	is	not	as	negative	as	one	may	think	at	first	glance;	in	fact,	it	proves	to	be	incredibly	useful	in	its	species-preserving	function,	until	it	becomes	self-defeating	that	is.	But,	by	way	of	anticipation,	we	may	ask	–	what	is	this	other	sense	of	the	utility	of	the	distortion	(historical	transformation)	that	is	not	simply	species	preserving?		The	other	sense	of	the	utility	of	the	distortion	of	consciousness	pertains	to	the	motivation	behind	an	individual	or	group	of	individuals	to	preserve	themselves	and	their	species.	Distortion	will	play	a	pivotal	role	in	uncovering	or	
generating	meaning	in	life,	which	is	crucial	to	finding	happiness.		Did	Prometheus	first	have	to	imagine	having	stolen	light	and	pay	for	it	before	he	could	finally	discover	that	he	had	created	light	by	desiring	
light,	and	that	not	only	man	but	also	god	was	the	work	of	his	own	hands	and	clay	in	his	hands?	(GS	300)	In	a	similar	vein,	Nietzsche	remarks:	“We,	however,	want	to	be	poets	of	our	lives”	(GS	299).	Nietzsche	thinks	that	somehow	we	distort	our	own	understanding	of	our	own	reality	and	our	own	life	in	a	way	that	is	somehow	Promethean	as	well	as	poetic	
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and	culminates	in	the	creation	of	meaning.	These	points	will	be	essential	to	our	understanding	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	meaning.	Back	to	formalization,	Katsafanas	notes,	a	generalization	or	linguistic	simplification	of	unconscious	experience	further	characterized	by	an	unavoidable	perspectival	condition	culminating	in	conceptualization	is	hardly	the	same	as	‘distortion;’	the	term	‘distort’	is	hardly	a	better	descriptor	for	this	condition	than	‘incomplete’	or	‘different’	is.	With	these	concerns	in	mind,	let	us	examine	exactly	why	Nietzsche	thinks	our	conceptualization	in	consciousness	is	inherently	transformative,	ceteris	paribas,	and	is	inherently	distortive	in	its	historical	instantiation.	Recalling	our	appeal	to	Schopenhauer’s	influence	on	Nietzsche,	we	must	remember	Schopenhauer’s	assertions	on	how	concepts	essentially	alter	what	is	perceived	and	do	not	simply	preserve	what	is.	Katsafanas	argues	for	four	different	types	of	conscious	transformation.		First,	our	conceptualization	transforms	or,	at	the	very	least,	alters	our	unconscious	perceptions	(not	yet	conceptualized	in	consciousness)	insofar	as	for	every	one	unconscious	perception	there	is	not	necessarily	only	one	conscious	concept.	Katsafanas	notes	that	there	is	not	a	one-to-one	correspondence	between	conscious	states	and	unconscious	states;	conscious	states	can	conceptualize	a	plurality	that	refers	to	an	unconscious	unity	as	well	as	conceptualize	a	unity	that	refers	to	an	unconscious	plurality.		Second,	our	conceptualization	transforms	unconscious	perceptions	(not	yet	conceptualized	in	consciousness)	by	the	way	in	which	a	metapsychological	thought	
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in	consciousness	interacts	with	an	unconscious	perception	in	a	world	directed	manner.		Third,	our	conceptualization	transforms	unconscious	perceptions	(not	yet	conceptualized	in	consciousness)	by	linguistically	determining	them	into	generalized	and	simplified	concepts.	Fourth,	our	conceptualization	transforms	unconscious	perceptions	(not	yet	conceptualized	in	consciousness)	since	the	way	in	which	conscious	states	interact	with	each	other	does	not	nicely	map	onto	the	way	in	which	unconscious	states	interact	with	one	another.	These	four	types	of	transformations	of	unconscious	perceptions	in	consciousness	(which	is	not	to	say	a	‘conscious	transformation’)	become	more	concrete	and	intelligible	by	way	of	Nietzsche’s	history	of	the	progression	(or	transformation	over	time)	of	moral	valuation	and	of	the	transformation	of	feelings	of	indebtedness	into	the	feelings	of	guilt,	both	of	which	are	described	in	the	
Genealogy	of	Morality.	These	concrete	examples	will	be	grounds	for	illustrating	how	our	perspectival	(fragmented	and	incomplete)	and	transformative	(see	the	four	instances	of	transformation	above)	consciousness	distorts	conscious	states	or	reality	as	such	in	its	historical	instantiation.	Further,	this	discussion	of	how	consciousness	as	such	has	been	historically	affected	is	not	only	a	way	to	make	intelligible	the	perspectival	and	transformative	character	of	consciousness	in	its	distortive	historical	instantiation,	it	is	also	the	reason	why	Nietzsche	thinks	that	our	historically	influenced	way	of	finding	meaning	in	life	is	self-defeating.	This	is	why	he	
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thinks	we	need	to	create	a	new	way	to	find	meaning	that	accounts	for	history	as	such	with	consciousness	as	such.		This	need	for	a	new	way	to	find	meaning	amounts	to	a	need	for	a	philosophy	of	how	to	make	sense	of	the	self	in	the	present	as	well	as	the	self	and	selves	as	they	have	manifested	in	the	past	in	order	to	best	project	oneself	into	the	future.															
	
	
Chapter	Two:	Nietzsche’s	Philosophy	of	History	
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Now	that	we	have	a	preliminary	understanding	of	how	the	self	makes	sense	of	the	world	at	any	given	present	moment,	we	will	investigate	the	Nietzsche’s	account	of	this	perspectival	transformation	of	consciousness	as	it	has	manifested	itself	over	the	course	of	history	in	a	way	that	distorts	what	is.	The	specific	ways	in	which	the	transformative	faculty	of	consciousness	of	groups	of	selves	in	history	have	distorted	concepts	informs	how	values	rise	to	prominence	and	fall	from	grace	as	well	as	how	values	interact	with	each	other	as	history	progresses.	Any	action	that	has	taken	place	by	any	individual	self	or	group	of	selves	in	the	past	(which	is	just	to	say	any	historical	action)	contains	this	perspectival	distortion,	in	a	certain	sense.	While,	in	history,	there	is	not	a	clean	process	of	a	nonconceptual	historical	action	being	distorted	into	a	conceptual	historical	action,	there	is	a	fairly	distinct	way	in	which	certain	values	prominent	at	a	given	historical	time	are	revalued	or	(re)conceptually	distorted,	in	a	way	that	begets	an	entirely	new	value	or	system	of	valuation.	Again,	the	process	of	valuation	consists	of	a	value	that	is	initially	conceptualized	in	a	certain	way	becoming	revalued	in	a	way	that	is	akin	to	the	distortion	of	consciousness.	Understanding	if	and	how	the	selves	involved	in	the	re-conceptualization	understand	their	own	actions	will	also	be	pertinent	to	our	task.	From	a	birds-eye-view,	we	can	lay	out	the	path	of	how	selves	in	the	past	distort	feelings,	emotions,	and	historical	facts	and	then,	in	turn,	reify	these	distorted	concepts	into	values.	Once	these	distorted	concepts	are	valued,	we	can	then	turn	to	how	these	values	progress	in	history.	At	first,	we	will	examine	how	an	initial	conceptualization	of	what	is	‘good’	is	revalued	or	distorted	as	a	conceptualization	of	
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what	is	‘evil’	and	how	an	initial	conceptualization	of	what	is	‘bad’	is	revalued	or	distorted	as	a	conceptualization	of	what	is	‘good.’	The	rise	to	prominence	of	the	Judeo-Christian	ethic	of	‘good’	and	‘evil’	that	results	from	this	slave	revolt	in	morality	is	not	only	a	historical	example	of	how	moral	concepts	are	revalued	into	
different	moral	concepts,	it	is	also	the	necessary	precondition	for	the	way	in	which	the	
punitive	conception	of	debt	in	civil	society,	and	the	bad	conscience	towards	ourselves	
that	accompanies	it,	is	then	revalued	into	the	religious	conception	of	guilt.	Then,	we	will	examine	how	feelings	of	indebtedness	are	conceptualized	in	a	way	that	transforms	or	distorts	them	into	feelings	of	guilt,	which,	in	turn,	begets	a	bad	conscience	towards	oneself.	These	feelings	of	guilt	are	reconceptualized	or	distorted	in	a	transition	from	a	guilt-conceptualized-in-civil-society	to	a	guilt-conceptualized-in-the-Christian-context.	The	bad	conscience	that	accompanies	this	Christian	conception	of	guilt	is	the	necessary	precondition	for	the	historical	positing	of	understanding	the	‘truth	about	God’	as	the	prescription	for	this	guilt	of	sin.	Nietzsche	believes	that	the	societal	origins	of	bad	conscience	become	so	deeply	ingrained	as	the	concept	of	sin	that	humans,	in	order	to	be	happy,	desperately	needed	to	understand	the	reason	for	their	supposed	sinfulness.	This	reason	historically,	took	a	religious	shape,	i.e.	the	Truth	about	our	guilt	towards	God	due	to	original	sin.	Understanding	the	Truth	about	God	is	meant	to	endow	our	suffering	with	meaning	and	therefore	make	life	bearable.	However,	we	will	also	show	how	Nietzsche	thinks	this	bad	conscience	is	never	actually	resolved	by	the	Christian	notion	of	truth;	historically,	the	quest	for	the	Truth	about	God	is	revalued	or	
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distorted	into	the	quest	for	Truth	in	Science.	Once	the	Christian	notion	of	truth	is	revalued	into	the	scientific	notion	of	truth,	the	very	prescription	meant	to	resolve	our	bad	conscience	towards	ourselves,	is	defeated	by	itself	when	modern	science	significantly	questions	the	possibility	of	the	existence	of	God.	Since	our	historical	prescription	for	our	feelings	of	bad	conscience	and	meaninglessness	are	self-defeating,	our	discussion	will	turn	to	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	meaning.			
2.1	The	Historical	Instantiation	of	Distortion	Part	One:	From	Good	and	Bad	to	Good	
and	Evil	through	the	Slave	Revolt	in	Morality	and	Ressentiment	The	slave	revolt	in	morality	is	the	title	for	the	historical	phenomenon	of	the	revaluation	of	terms	denoting	‘good’	and	‘bad’	into	terms	denoting	‘evil’	and	‘good,’	respectively.	Further,	this	revaluation	is	marked	by	a	specific	characteristic,	which	Nietzsche	denotes	as	ressentiment.	Nietzsche,	being	the	esteemed	philologist	he	was,	begins	his	story	of	the	progression	of	the	valuation	of	moral	concepts	in	Ancient	Greece.	Nietzsche	starts	by	illustrating	the	character	of	the	conception	of	‘good’	and	the	character	of	the	conception	of	‘bad’	in	Ancient	Greece.	The	term	‘good’	in	the	ancient	Greek	is	‘Esthlos’	and	connoted	terms	such	as	‘brave’	and	‘noble.’	The	term	‘bad’	in	ancient	Greek	is	‘Kakos’	and	connoted	terms	such	as	‘common’	or	‘base.’	Nietzsche	explicates	how	the	moral	conception	of	‘good’	and	‘bad’	and	the	valuation	of	‘good’	over	‘bad’	in	ancient	Greece	were	ingrained	in	notions	of	political	and	physical	superiority:	
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The	judgment	“good”	did	not	originate	with	those	to	whom	“goodness”	was	shown!	Rather	it	was	“the	good”	themselves,	that	is	to	say,	the	noble,	powerful,	high-stationed,	and	high-minded	who	felt	and	established	themselves	and	their	actions	as	good,	that	is,	of	the	first	rank,	in	contradistinction	to	all	the	low,	low-minded,	common	and	plebeian	(GM	I.2).	Essentially,	Nietzsche	is	positing	a	narrative	that	states	that	the	powerful	and	aristocratic	class	of	ancient	Greece	had	the	political	power	to	value	moral	concepts	and,	being	the	powerful	class,	i.e.	politically	and	physically	superior,	they	created	a	moral	concept	that	described	themselves	as	the	‘good.’		Once	they,	through	internal	examination	of	their	own	qualities,	knew	themselves	to	be	the	‘good,’	they	looked	outward	and	called	that	which	they	are	not,	the	‘bad.’			 After	an	etymological	investigation,	ad	nauseam,	of	the	terms	‘good’	and	‘bad’	in	the	context	of	Ancient	Greek,	Latin,	German,	French,	and	English,	Nietzsche	begins	a	deliberately	provocative	and	intentionally	unsystematic	account	of	how	these	politically	and	physically	infused	ancient	notions	of	‘good’	and	‘bad’	become	the	Christian	infused	modern	ethical	notions	of	‘evil’	and	‘good,’	respectively.	Nietzsche	argues	that	the	people	characterized	as	‘bad’	by	the	ancient	Greek	system	of	valuation	were,	simply,	upset	with	being	at	the	bottom	of	the	valuation	totem	poll.	In	order	to	secure	a	better	chance	at	survival	for	themselves,	these	‘bad’	individuals	decided	to	turn	the	prevailing	system	of	valuation	on	its	head	so	that	they	can	be	on	the	top	of	the	valuation	totem	poll.	We	must	note	the	distinctive	characteristic	of	
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this	revaluation.	When	the	Greeks	determined	their	system	of	valuation,	it	began	with	looking	inward	and	positing	what	one	is	as	‘good’	and	by	virtue	of	opposition,	what	is	not	‘good’	is	‘bad.’	The	slave	revolt	in	morality,	however,	is	characterized	by	looking	outward	and	saying	that	what	is	commonly	understood	as	‘good’	is	actually	‘evil’	and	by	virtue	of	opposition,	what	is	not	‘evil’	is	‘good.’	This	is	external	denial	is	the	unique	characteristic	of	ressentiment.	Nietzsche	elaborates:	While	every	noble	morality	develops	from	a	triumphant	affirmation	of	itself,	slave	morality	from	the	outset	says	No	to	what	is	“outside,”	what	is	“different,”	what	is	“not	itself”;	and	this	No	is	its	creative	deed.	This	inversion	of	the	value-positing	eye-	this	need	to	direct	one’s	view	outward	instead	of	back	to	oneself	–	is	the	essence	of	ressentiment	(GM	I.10).	This	is	affectionately	called	the	‘slave	revolt	in	morality’	not	simply	because	these	men	of	ressentiment	where	in	the	lower	class	of	society,	but	also	because,	due	to	their	externally	denying	essence,	the	men	of	ressentiment	were	slaves	to	that	which	was	not	themselves.	This	is	just	to	say	that	the	men	of	ressentiment	needed	an	already	prevailing	system	of	valuation	to	externally	deny;	the	slave	revolt	in	morality	is	dependent	on	and	originates	in	another	system	of	valuation	and	is	therefore,	in	a	sense,	enslaved	to	it.			 Here,	not	only	do	we	see	a	historical	instance	of	the	distortion	of	concepts	(of	‘good’	to	‘evil’	and	of	‘bad’	to	‘good’)	we	also	see	an	instance	of	historical	distortion	based	in	a	theory	of	perspectivism.	In	a	famous	analogy,	Nietzsche	likens	the	slaves	
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of	ressentiment	to	‘little	lambs’	who,	from	their	perspective,	clearly	believe	that	the	‘birds	of	prey’	(Ancient	Greek	nobility)	that	feed	on	them	are	evil.	However,	the	birds	of	prey	simply	regard	the	little	lambs	as	food	and,	in	fact,	love	the	little	lambs	for	their	nourishment.	Essentially,	Nietzsche	wants	to	illustrate	that	the	valuing	of	‘good’	over	‘evil’	is	not	some	divinely	inspired	end-all,	be-all	notion	of	morality	but	instead	is	an	incredibly	clever	and	effective	power	grab	based	on	revaluing	the	center	of	the	prevailing	moral	system.	Nietzsche	summarizes	this	revaluation:	How	different	these	words	“bad”	and	“evil”	are,	although	they	are	both	apparently	the	opposite	of	the	same	concept	“good.”	But	it	is	not	the	same	concept	“good”:	one	should	ask	rather	precisely	who	is	“evil”	in	the	sense	of	the	morality	of	ressentiment.	The	answer,	in	all	strictness	is:	precisely	the	“good	man”	of	the	other	morality	(GMI.11).		At	this	juncture,	we	not	only	have	made	intelligible	our	first	historical	instance	of	perspectival	distortion,	in	the	context	of	moral	valuation,	we	also	have	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	necessary	precondition	of	the	second	historical	instance	of	perspectival	distortion.	It	is	important	to	remember,	as	we	move	into	section	2.2,	that	there	are	two	narratives	at	play	here.	The	first	narrative	is	a	speculative	narrative	regarding	how	our	conclusions	about	the	perspectival	transformation	of	conscious	states	are	given	a	sense	of	instantiated	actuality	in	the	history	of	the	progression	(conceptualization	and	re-conceptualization)	of	moral	valuation,	which	is	characterized	by	distortion.	The	second	narrative	is	a	more	historically	chronological	one	in	which	we	trace	the	progression	of	historical	moments	of	moral	
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valuation	and	revaluation.	In	regard	to	this	second	narrative,	we	have	just	moved	from	a	historical	moment	of	master	morality	to	the	historical	moment	of	the	slave	morality	of	the	Judeo-Christian	ethic;	it	was	of	course	the	Jewish	hate	of	or	
ressentiment	towards	the	powerful	and	noble	that	beget	the	Christian	love	for	the	weak	and	common.	Working	within	the	context	of	slave	morality,	we	can	have	a	better	understanding	of	how	the	conceptual	revaluation	of	the	societal	notion	of	debt	to	the	religious	notion	of	guilt	begets	a	bad	conscience	towards	oneself	that	is	incredibly	difficult	to	purge.	Bad	conscience	arises	from	societal	notions	of	debt,	but	bad	conscience	becomes	dangerous	only	in	the	religious	context.			
2.2	The	Historical	Instantiation	of	Distortion	Part	Two:	From	Debt	to	Guilt	through	
Bad	Conscience	The	way	in	which	feelings	of	indebtedness	transform	into	feelings	of	guilt	hinges	on	a	proper	understanding	of	the	concept	of	‘bad	conscience.’	As	understood	by	any	historian	who	looks	at	the	vast	amount	of	blood	and	cruelty	present	throughout	humanity’s	darkest	as	well	as	brightest	civilizations	and	achievements,	Nietzsche	argues	that	humans	have	a	very	strong	and	primal	desire	for	hostility	and	destruction.	This	desire	cannot	be	consummated	explicitly	within	the	confines	of	a	civil	society.	This	desire	must	be	reconciled	in	a	different	way,	since	the	desire	for	cruelty	does	not	merely	disappear	upon	the	lack	of	consummation,	as	the	argument	goes.	Nietzsche	states	that	we	internalize	this	unconsummated	desire	for	cruelty	
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and	reconcile	it,	in	a	way,	by	forming	a	‘bad	conscience’	towards	this	cruelty.	As	he	puts	it:		 This	drive…forcibly	made	latent…pushed	back	and	repressed,	incarcerated	within	and	finally	able	to	discharge	and	vent	only	upon	itself:	that,	and	that	alone,	is	what	the	bad	conscience	is	in	its	beginnings	(GM	II.17).		Our	bad	conscience	arises	not	simply	due	to	the	way	we	must	sublimate	our	cruel	drives	in	society,	but	also	by	the	fact	that	it	is	juxtaposed	with	healthier	internalizations	of	other	drives	in	society.		Commenting	on	this	process,	Katsafanas	observes:		Not	all	drives	are	internalized	in	this	way.	Nietzsche	is	careful	to	stress	that	it	is	the	drives	of	“hostility,	cruelty,	joy	in	persecuting,	in	attacking,	in	change,	in	destruction”	which	are	internalized	(GM	II.16).	But	other	drives	are	not	internalized:	drives	for	social	bonding,	for	food,	for	sex…are…aided	by	the	establishment	of	a	community.	(NS	62)		The	feeling	of	anguish,	the	negative	aspect	of	‘bad	conscience,’	arises	from	the	lack	of	reconcilability	of	our	inability	to	consummate	our	drives	to	cruelty	within	the	context	of	civil	society	with	our	drives	for	social	bonding,	et	cetera,	which	are	actually	cultivated	by	and	flourish	within	the	context	of	civil	society.	This	is	why	Nietzsche	states	that	the	person	in	society	has	a	“soul	voluntarily	at	odds	with	itself”	(GM	II.18).		
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When	we	form	civil	society	and	community,	we	favor	drives	towards	social	bonding,	food,	sex,	et	cetera	over	our	drives	towards	cruelty,	but	as	stated	above,	these	drives	do	not	go	away,	they	are	internalized.	Katsafanas	notes	the	paradoxical,	almost	comically	futile	way	in	which	humans	have	historically	‘ridded’	themselves	of	their	drives	to	cruelty.	Resulting	from	the	anguish	of	being	pulled	in	multiple	directions,	humans	are	forced	to	choose	a	type	of	drive	to	explicitly	consummate,	so	to	speak.		By	forming	civil	society,	humans	chose	to	consummate	drives	that	are	consistent	with	the	values	of	community,	as	expressed	above.	However,	the	internalization	of	the	drives	we	did	not	choose	were	internalized,	sublimated,	and	transformed	in	a	way	that	allowed	them	to	be	consummated	in	civil	society	(one	might	even	say	that	they	were	distorted	in	the	process).	Here,	we	might	keep	in	mind	a	parallel	to	how	unconscious	nonconceptual	perceptions	are	transformed	or	
conceptualized	into	concepts	in	conscious	states.	By	explicitly	consummating	drives	that	are	consistent	with	the	values	of	civil	society	at	the	expense	of	drives	that	are	not	(i.e.,	the	drive	to	cruelty),	we	end	up	consummating	drives	that	we	thought	we	left	behind	at	the	gates	of	Community,	albeit	in	a	disguised	form,	by	internalizing	and	changing	(transforming)	these	drives	enough	so	they	can	be	in	a	form	that	is	consistent	with	civil	society.	This	sublimation	does	not	do	away	with	the	inherent	opposition	of	the	differing	sets	of	drives,	which,	coupled	with	the	entirety	of	this	process,	results	in	a	‘bad	conscience’	towards	oneself.		
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We	should	not	ignore	the	fact	that	this	is	a	clear	historical	expression	of	how	the	HOT	of	consciousness	illustrates	our	manner	of	conceptualizing.	As	Katsafanas	observes:	 Paradoxically,	the	internalization	of	the	aggressive	drives	consists	in	the	repression	of	the	aggressive	drives	by	the	social	drives,	which,	in	this	act	of	repression,	express	the	aggressive	drives	in	a	new	internalized	form…So	the	social	drives	come	to	include,	as	an	essential	component,	a	drive	to	repress	the	outwardly	directed	aggressive	drives…The	internalization	of	the	aggressive	drives,	then,	consists	in	the	aggressive	drives	finding	expression	in	the	social	drives’	repression	and	condemnation	of	the	outwardly	directed	aggressive	drives.	(NS	62-63)	Now	that	we	have	an	understanding	of	what	bad	conscience	is,	we	should	turn	our	discussion	to	the	exact	historical	feelings	that	were	conceptualized	or	distorted	in	a	way	that	begot	this	state	of	bad	conscience.		As	previously	noted,	this	process	begins	with	how	feelings	of	indebtedness	are	transformed	into	feelings	of	guilt.	By	way	of	anticipation,	the	way	that	these	feelings	of	indebtedness	are	reconceptualized	to	feelings	of	guilt	and	then	again	to	feelings	of	guilt	towards	God	illuminates	our	discussion	of	master	and	slave	morality.	Nietzsche	argues	that	the	bad	conscience	towards	ourselves	based	in	our	anguish	over	our	‘soul	at	war	with	itself’	is	conceptualized	in	a	religious	context	by	the	Judeo-Christian	ethic.	Indebtedness,	which	was	originally	a	feeling	of	unfulfilled	
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obligation	that	was	immediately	and	explicitly	reconciled	with	cruel	punishment,	is	sublimated	in	society	in	the	aforementioned	way.	This	sublimating	of	indebtedness	is	accompanied	by	a	bad	conscience	in	society	and	transformed	into	guilt.	However,	when	bad	conscience	is	conceptualized	in	a	religious	context,	under	the	historical	moment	of	the	prominence	of	slave	morality,	the	Christianized	bad	conscience	that	accompanies	indebtedness	as	guilt	is	now	guilt	towards	an	unfulfilled	obligation	to	God;	our	bad	conscience	towards	an	unfulfilled	obligation	to	God	is	then	retroactively	reasoned	as	originating	in	an	inherent	sinfulness	present	in	all	humans,	i.e.	the	Christian	notion	of	original	sin.	Katsafanas	states,	“That	is,	bad	conscience,	the	complex	affect	resulting	form	the	internalization	of	aggressive	drives,	is	interpreted	as	the	feeling	of	guilt	that	results	from	our	sinful	nature”	(NS	63).	In	other	words,	what	was	once	a	feeling	resulting	from	an	unfulfilled	promise	(the	concept	of	indebtedness	in	primal	society)	becomes	the	concept	of	guilt	(the	concept	of	indebtedness	in	civil	society),	which	begets	a	bad	conscience	towards	oneself,	culminating	in	the	concept	of	sin	when	placed	in	the	Christian	context	(guilt	towards	an	unfulfilled	obligation	towards	God,	which	is	accompanied	by	a	bad	conscience).		Of	course,	as	Nietzsche	states,	when	one	views	oneself	as	inherently	sinful,	there	are	profound	affects	and	effects.	Nietzsche	argues	that	one	develops	such	a	contempt	for	what	is	natural	in	oneself,	one	learns	to	deny	oneself	and	to	deny	life,	which	causes	a	sick	desire	for	more	pain	and	more	denial	of	life	because	one	thinks	that	this	is	the	antidote	for	their	inherent	sickness,	when	it	is	really	a	symptom	of	a	
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religiously	(Judeo-Christian)	conceptualized	bad	conscience	as	guilt	towards	an	unfulfilled	obligation	to	God.	Yet	out	of	this	transformation	of	the	religious	bad	conscience	as	guilt	(where	sinfulness	is	a	compelling	reason	for	the	inherent	suffering	of	the	world),	one	finds	positive	results.	Humans	become	more	interested	in	finding	a	meaning	for	or	an	explanation	of	the	ever-present	suffering	in	life,	even	
if	it	means	desiring	denying	oneself	(one’s	natural	drives)	over	desiring	suffering	
meaninglessly.	The	power	of	accounting	for	the	human	condition	of	suffering	that	comes	with	the	explanation	of	original	sin	is	the	historical	reason	as	to	why	we	never	ridded	ourselves	of	this	bad	conscience,	even	though	it	clearly	has	its	own	negative	affects.	Katsafanas	summarizes:		Nietzsche	claims	that	the	becoming	conscious	of	the	bad	conscience	as	guilt	leads	to	all	of	the	following,	“(a)	It	causes	the	bad	conscience	to	become	“more	firmly	rooted”	and	“to	spread”	(GM	II.21	and	III.15).	(b)	It	eliminates	the	depression	engendered	by	the	thought	that	one’s	suffering	is	senseless	(GM	III.15,	III.20).	(c)	It	creates	a	craving	for	new	types	of	suffering	(GM	III.20).	(NS	64)	Further,	Katsafanas	notes	the	amalgamation	of	causal	influences	at	play:	the	consciousness	of	the	newly	conceptualized	bad	conscience	as	guilt	retroactively	alters	the	unconscious	states	(moving	from	discharging	a	lack	of	fulfillment	of	one’s	obligations	to	indebtedness	to	guilt)	as	well	the	new	desire	for	suffering	based	on	this	created	understanding	of	sin	among	others.		
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This	conceptualizing	of	the	bad	conscience	as	religious	guilt,	which	is	then,	in	turn,	reasoned	to	originate	in	an	inherent	sinfulness	is	a	type	of	conceptualization	that	makes	the	affects	of	bad	conscience	worse	than	it	already	was.	This	type	of	conceptualization	does	not	allow	for	a	way	to	understand	what	is	natural	in	humans	as	natural,	and	instead	forces	us	to	understand	what	is	natural	as	counterproductive	to	a	civil	society	and	therefore	undesirable.	It	further	sublimates	these	aggressive	drives,	stifling,	altering,	and	distorting	them	more	while	making	one	feel	guilty	more	and	more	since	they	never	truly	go	away	by	this	process,	which	makes	the	entirety	of	this	type	of	conceptualization	self-defeating.	Katsafanas	notes	that	Nietzsche	believes	this	is	why	the	Greeks	stressed	the	concept	of	the	contest,	because	it	allowed	for	an	awareness	of	the	animal	drives	as	well	as	a	safe	outlet	to	express	these	drives,	as	opposed	to	sublimating	and	not	doing	away	with	them	in	a	vicious	circle.	 Now,	we	are	in	a	position	to	revisit	the	distortion	thesis.	If	the	conscious	state	of	guilt	presents	its	self	as	a	unified	emotion	even	though	it	is	actually	a	complex	system	involving	societal	sublimation	of	animalistic	tendencies,	secular	indebtedness,	religious	guilt,	feelings	of	inherent	sin,	etc.,	then	is	it	not	true	that	a	conscious	unity	transforms	an	unconscious	plurality	in	a	distortive	manner	in	its	historical	instantiation?	Furthermore,	if	the	unconscious	state	of	bad	conscience	originating	from	entering	into	society	and	sublimating	aggressive	drives	without	extinguishing	them	is	transformed	into	this	religious	conception	of	failing	God	and	being	inherently	sinful	in	consciousness,	then	is	it	not	true	that	conscious	states	
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causally	influence	(transforms)	the	unconscious	state	in	a	way	that	distorts	the	original	unconscious	state?	Moreover,	if	one	understands	the	difference	between	someone	who	has	a	bad	conscience	and	someone	who	feels	guilty,	in	the	way	described	above,	is	it	not	true	that	conscious	states	transform	unconscious	states	and	distort	them	historically?		Finally,	if	the	ascetic	priest	actually	increases	feelings	of	guilt	by	trying	to	rid	himself	of	this	guilt	(renouncing	aggressive	drives	actually	sublimates	them	and	gives	them	a	new	form),	do	relations	between	conscious	states	not	differ	from	the	relations	between	unconscious	states?		The	priest	thinks	that	ridding	oneself	of	guilt	is	as	simple	as	renouncing	what	makes	him	guilty.		However,	in	Nietzsche’s	view,	unconscious	states	do	not	work	as	logically	nor	as	linear	as	their	conscious	counterparts.		Herein	lies	another	way	in	which	the	conscious	states	differ	from	and	distorts	the	unconscious	states	as	manifested	in	history.	As	Katsafanas	puts	it:	“Conscious	thought	presents	itself	as	linear,	ordered,	logical,	connected,	sentential…But	unconscious	thought	doesn’t	–	it	may	be	associative,	a-rational,	shifted	about	by	various	drives,	and	so	forth”	(NS	67).	The	linguistic	aspect	of	our	conceptualization	in	conscious	states	tricks	humans,	so	to	speak,	into	thinking	that	concepts	themselves	are	logical,	when	their	unconscious	grounding	is	not.	The	fact	that	conscious	states	behave	differently	than	unconscious	states	not	only	causes	problems	(as	in	the	case	of	the	ascetic	priest),	it	also	provides	an	additional	aspect	of	how	consciousness	historically	distorts.		
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The	allure	of	grammar	not	only	tricks	us	into	thinking	that	the	entirety	of	perception	(conscious	and	unconscious	states)	is	as	logical	as	grammar	is,	when	unconscious	states	are,	in	fact,	not	logical	in	that	way.		Grammar,	specifically	the	subject-predicate	structure,	formulates	our	belief	about	a	unified	ego	behind	all	action,	thereby	contributing	to	the	distortion	inherent	in	that	belief.		Nietzsche	himself	endorses	this	picture	of	how	we	take	our	concepts	about	the	world	that	are	originally	meant	to	merely	be	a	useful	way	of	understanding	our	relation	between	our	unconscious	states	and	the	world	in	our	conscious	state	and	mistake	them	for	fixed	laws	about	the	world.	Nietzsche	states,	“	We	created…Small	wonder	that	later	he	was	always	found	in	things	only	that	which	he	had	put	into	
them”	(TI	VI.3).			
2.3	The	Historical	Instantiation	of	Distortion	Part	Three:	From	Truth	and	Illusion	
through	the	Possibility	of	Meaning	over	Nihilism	The	ascetic	priest	thinks,	as	noted,	that	people	are	doing	away	with	their	sins	by	denying	their	natural	cruel	tendencies,	when	they	are	in	fact	consummating	these	same	cruel	drives	in	a	sublimated	and	distorted	way.		This	scenario	is	not	only	consistent	with	the	account,	given	above,	of	how	consciousness	creates	a	transformed	perspective	out	of	the	unconscious	states	that	compete	with	yet	constitute	said	conscious	state.	It	is	also	consistent	with	our	historical	valuation	of	truth	as	the	highest	value.	Enlightenment	thinkers	thought	that	they	were	doing	away	with	the	historical	mistake	of	blind	belief	in	God	by	positing	truth	as	the	
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highest	value	and	by	attempting	to	be	true	by	using	their	objective,	interest-free	reasoning	capabilities.	However,	like	the	ascetic	priest	who	mistakenly	thought	he	was	doing	away	with	his	guilt	towards	inherent	sin,	but	was	actually	perpetuating	his	guilt,	these	Enlightenment	thinkers	were	actually	continuing	the	historical	effect	of	the	ascetic	ideal.		This	manner	of	positing	truth	above	all	else	originates	in	the	Christian	tradition	of	striving	towards	discerning	the	truth	about	God.	Nietzsche	illustrates	how	the	Enlightenment	and	scientific	will	to	truth	originate	in	the	Christian	ascetic	ideal	and	the	will	to	truth	about	God	by	stating	that	the	scientific	ideal	is	the	ascetic	ideal’s	“most	recent	and	noblest	form”:		What	compels	one	to	this,	however,	this	unconditional	will	to	truth,	is	the	belief	in	the	ascetic	ideal	itself,	even	if	as	its	unconscious	imperative	–	do	not	deceive	yourself	about	this,	--	it	is	the	belief	in	a	
metaphysical	value,	a	value	in	itself	of	truth	as	it	is	established	and	guaranteed	alone	(GOM	III.23,	III.24).		This	account	of	the	belief	is	not	only	consistent	with	our	theories	of	how	consciousness	arises	out	of	a	transformation	of	unconscious	states.		It	is	also	consistent	with	how	our	consciousness	distorts	or	is	distorted	and	how	we	create	values	based	on	perceived	utility.		The	unfortunate	thing	is	that	the	logical	conclusion	of	this	distortion	is	not	actually	useful;	in	fact,	it	is	self-defeating.	By	transforming	our	Christian	ethic	and	our	hope	for	the	Christian	afterlife	into	a	sublimated	version	of	Truth	as	such	we	
	60			
actually	posit	a	way	of	disproving	the	Christian	ideal	of	God	and	heaven.	The	logical	conclusion	of	the	Christian	ascetic	ideal	as	Truth	as	such	disproves	itself	and	therefore	annihilates	our	values	and	our	‘answers’	for	our	deepest	concerns.	When	our	deepest	values	are	annihilated	in	this	way,	we	fall	into	a	very	dangerous,	nihilistic	place.		If	one	disregards	the	ascetic	ideal:	man,	the	animal	man,	has	until	now	had	no	meaning…precisely	this	is	what	the	ascetic	ideal	means:	that	something	was	lacking,	that	an	enormous	void	surrounded	man	–	he	did	not	know	how	to	justify,	to	explain,	to	affirm	himself;	he	suffered	from	this	problem	of	his	meaning.	(GM	III.28)	Basically	due	to	the	lack	of	inherent	meaning	in	life,	we	used	our	distorting	consciousness	to	posit	a	way	to	create	meaning,	but	we	did	so	in	a	way	in	which	the	
logical	conclusion	of	our	created	meaning	defeats	itself.	This	is	why	Nietzsche	thinks	we	need	a	new	way	to	create	meaning	in	our	lives.									
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Chapter	Three:	Nietzsche’s	Philosophy	of	Meaning	The	third	constituent	of	the	totality	of	the	self	is	the	part	of	the	self	that	makes	sense	of	the	prior	two	and	creates	meaning	within	it.	This	is	to	say	the	best	or	most	useful	way	for	any	self	to	project	itself	into	the	future	consists	first,	in	making	sense	of	its	own	consciousness	and	process	of	conceptualization	(the	self	in	the	present,	philosophy	of	mind).	It	consists,	secondly,	in	developing	a	meaningful	account	of	this	becoming	of	consciousness	and	of	the	conceptualization	or	distortion	of	concepts	as	they	have	manifest	over	the	course	of	history	(the	self	in	the	past,	philosophy	of	history).	The	interesting	thing	here	is	that	the	making	sense	of	the	self	in	the	present	and	the	making	sense	of	the	self	in	the	past	is	under	the	umbrella	of,	if	you	will,	making	sense	of	one’s	own	personal	history.	In	the	experience	of	internal,	lived	time	or	factical	existence,	we	are	automatically	placed	into	a	specific	point	in	history.	Our	self	in	the	present	is	placed	on	or	thrown	into	a	point	on	the	timeline	of	history.	Our	self	in	the	present	then	moves	along	this	timeline	or	projects	himself	into	the	future.	This	is	just	to	say	that	as	time	passes	in	an	individual’s	life,	history	splits	into	two:	the	external	history	of	the	world	(typically	written	in	textbooks)	and	the	internal	history	of	lived	experience	or	of	factical	existence.	However,	since	the	self	in	the	present	is	inherently	perspectival,	the	facts	of	external	history	are	experienced	within	the	context	of	factical	existence.	This	means	that	when	one	attempts	to	find	meaning	in	life,	the	effort	amounts	to	creating	meaning	by	(a)	unifying	the	implications	of	the	perspectival	conceptualization	of	the	self	in	the	present	with	the	perspectival	concepts,	values,	and	actions	of	the	self	in	one’s	own	past	and	(b)	by	
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projecting	oneself	into	the	future	in	a	specific	way	over	time.	Of	course,	all	of	this	already	takes	place	at	a	specific	point	on	the	external	historical	timeline	The	way	in	which	one	unifies	all	of	the	constituents	and	sub-constituents	of	the	self	qua	meaning	takes	place	in	the	future.	Of	course,	it	is	seemingly	absurd	to	write	(in	the	present)	of	the	unification	of	meaning	taking	place	in	the	future,	but	the	projection	of	the	future	is	the	theater	in	which	meaning	can	be	outlined	and	grasped.	As	previously	stated,	the	way	in	which	we	unify	meaning	is	dependent	on	both	facts	about	values	and	actions	in	external	and	internal	history.	This	means	that	our	created	meaning	must	take	into	account	as	well	as	neutralize,	in	a	sense,	the	self-defeating	conceptions	and	valuation	thereof	by	selves	in	external	history;	our	created	meaning	must	take	into	account	the	historical	instantiation	of	distortion.	Further,	this	means	that	our	created	meaning	must	also	transform	any	disharmony	between	the	values	and	actions	making	up	our	internal	history.	Finally,	our	created	meaning	must	be	created	in	a	way	that	is	actualized	over	time,	but	somehow	accessible	to	the	perspectival	self	in	the	present.	The	way	in	which	we	take	into	account	yet	cure,	so	to	speak,	our	positing	of	self-defeating	conceptions	as	the	highest	values	in	external	history	and	the	bad	conscience	that	arose	from	it	with	our	created	meaning	in	the	projected	future	is	a	matter	of	reconceptualizing	‘truth’	and	‘illusion’	(see	3.1	below).	The	way	in	which	we	harmonize	the	disharmony	of	our	values	and	actions	in	internal	history	with	our	created	meaning	in	the	future	is	closely	connected	to	Nietzsche’s	practical	thought	experiment	of	the	eternal	recurrence	as	well	as	a	new	conceptualization	of	artistry	and	honesty	(see	3.2	
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below).	At	issue	throughout	the	following	considerations	is	how	we	can	understand	the	projects	of	both	curing	an	external	history	of	valuing	self-defeating	conceptions	and	of	harmonizing	our	own	internal	history	of	values	and	actions	in	the	present,	and	doing	so	in	a	way	that	meaningfully	unifies	these	two	aspects	of	our	historical	experience.			
3.1	Truth	as	Illusion	and	Illusion	as	Truth			Returning	to	our	main	theme,	we	note	that	Nietzsche	thinks	that	we	must	find	a	new	way	to	create	meaning	that	accounts	for	the	becoming	of	consciousness	as	well	as	our	historically	affected	consciousness	that	hinges	on	a	way	to	make	our	thoroughly	
perspectival	and	historically	distortive	condition	more	useful.	The	best	way	to	make	
this	intelligible	to	our	historically	affected	consciousness	as	such	is	to	discuss	different	
ways	of	understanding	our	conception	of	truth	and	illusion.	Then,	we	can	illustrate	
how	our	new	conception	of	truth	and	illusion	can	be	useful	through	honest	assessment	
and	artistic	illusion	in	order	to	redeem	the	meaning	of	our	lives.	One	way	to	understand	this	process	is	through	Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of	the	eternal	recurrence.		The	connections	that	have	been	drawn	between	the	becoming	of	consciousness	and	the	historically	affected	consciousness	are	intimately	related	
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to	this	doctrine.		Establishing	this	relationship	will	help	make	intelligible	the	continued	esotericism	present	in	this	overall	Nietzschean	system.3		Our	guide	into	the	curious	connection	between	truth	and	illusion	in	Nietzsche’s	text	is	R.	Lanier	Anderson’	paper,	“Nietzsche	on	Truth,	Illusion,	and	Redemption.”	In	this	paper,	Anderson	attempts	to	illustrate	the	natures	of	truth	and	of	illusion.	With	the	help	of	an	explication	of	Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of	the	eternal	
recurrence	and	of	Nietzschean	affirmation,	Anderson	is	then	able	illustrate	the	close	
connection	between	truth	and	illusion	and	how	to	practically	implement	the	meaning	
of	this	connection	in	our	lives	through	honesty	and	artistry.		Anderson	begins	his	discussion	of	the	natures	of	truth	and	illusion	by	illustrating	how	to	provide	a	consistent	and	genuine	framework	for	understanding	Nietzschean	distortion	while	avoiding	a	self-referential	paradox.	After	reconciling	the	existence	of	truth	and	knowledge	with	distortion,	he	attempts	to	affirm	the	value	of	truth	as	such,	scientific	truth,	without	compromising	the	value	of	illusion.	Moving	from	the	possibility	of	existence	of	the	two	seemingly	contradictory	ideas,	Anderson	
elucidates	how	the	value	of	these	two	ideas,	truth	and	illusion,	can	function	together.	Here,	Anderson	even	demonstrates	the	reasons	why	Nietzsche	chose	to	affirm	these	two	seemingly	contradictory	concepts	without	trying	to	explicitly	reconcile	them.		(Consideration	of	these	reasons	will	help	us	understand	the	ties	to	the	deliberate	contradiction	seen	in	Eastern	mysticism.)	Then,	by	invoking	Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of																																																									3	In	light	of	all	of	this	we	will	finally	be	in	a	position	to	ask	ourselves	what	the	meaning	of	this	esoteric	and	confusing	way	of	presenting	a	deeply	thought	through	and	sneakily	systematic	philosophy	is.	
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eternal	recurrence,	Anderson	attempts	to	show	how	a	genuine	affirmation	thereof	
involves	the	affirmation	of	both	of	these	ideas.	Anderson	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	how	honesty	and	artistry	help	our	understanding	of	the	implications	of	the	relationship	between	truth	and	illusion	for	our	redemption.		Anderson	explains	the	task	of	unpacking	the	conceptions	of	truth	and	illusion	as	follows:	“Clearly,	then,	the	real	exegetical	burden	we	must	face	is	to	explain	how	Nietzsche	could	have	thought	himself	entitled	to	both	kinds	of	claim	at	once”	(NTIR	186).	Anderson	wants	to	draw	our	attention	to	the	possibility	that	we	have	hitherto	alluded	to,	the	possibility	that	Nietzsche	is	deliberately	contradictory	in	his	explicit	musings	on	truth	and	illusion	in	order	to	fully	explicate	the	nature	of	the	formal	content,	the	close	relationship	between	truth	and	illusion	themselves.	Our	new	conception	of	truth	and	illusion	and	their	literary	affect	hinges	on	an	understanding	of	how	the	becoming	of	consciousness	and	of	our	historically	affected	consciousness	as	such	relates	to	the	way	in	which	we	use	truth	and	illusion	practically	as	honesty	and	artistry,	respectively,	in	order	to	find	meaning	in	our	historical	lives	as	such.	If	
we	can	re-conceptualize	‘truth’	and	‘illusion’	in	a	way	that	is	more	consistent	with	our	
thoroughgoing	perspectival	consciousness	and	its	distortive	historical	instantiation,	
then	we	will	be	able	to	have	a	good	conscience	towards	new	illusions	affirmed	as	
truths	that	actually	redeem	meaning	in	our	lives	instead	of	illusions	merely	purported	
as	truths	that	defeat	themselves.		Obviously,	it	makes	sense	to	question	the	value	of	truth	at	this	point,	given	that	Nietzsche	denies	the	existence	of	objective,	interest	free,	necessary	truths	yet	
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he	still	posits	their	historical	utility.	The	value,	or	lack	thereof,	of	truth	will,	of	course,	further	inform	the	value	of	illusion,	which	will,	in	turn,	make	intelligible	the	value	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	seemingly	contradictory	concepts.	So,	how	can	truth	as	such	still	be	valuable?	We	have	an	understanding	of	how	concepts	become	valuable	in	general	and	how	objective	and	a-perspectival	necessary	‘Truths’	are	impossible,	given	the	interpretation	of	the	becoming	of	consciousness	in	Chapter	One.		(Hereafter,	I	capitalize	‘Truth’	to	designate	this	understanding).	We	also	have	an	understanding	of	how	Truth	is	historically	thought	to	be	valuable,	given	the	account	of	the	evolution	of	moral	concepts	in	Chapter	Two.	Yet	we	do	not	yet	know	exactly	how	a	truthful	illusion	can	be	valuable	in	a	way	that	is	authentic	and	not	self-defeating.	Nietzsche	consistently	asserts	that	art	lies	about	the	world	by	suggesting	what	the	world	could	be	like	or	even	by	simply	transforming	the	world	ever	so	slightly,	which	is	reminiscent	to	how	our	perspectival	consciousness	transforms	and	the	world	of	non-conceptualized	perception	and	of	historical	values.	This	deliberate	artistic	distortion	of	the	world,	consistent	with	how	we	already	transform	and	distort	
the	world	mind	you,	is	the	lie	with	good	conscience,	the	illusion	of	art.	Nietzsche	sates,	“Now	our	honesty	has	a	counterforce	which	helps	us	to	avoid	[its	bad]	consequences:	art	as	the	good	will	to	appearance”	(GS	107).	Further,	Nietzsche	states	that	artists	help	us,	“make	things	beautiful,	attractive,	and	desirable	for	ourselves	when	they	are	not”	(GS	299).		The	suggestion	is	that	conscious	artistic	distortions	asserted	as	truths,	i.e.	truthful	illusions,	are	the	most	useful	deceptive	
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conceptualizations	for	us.	Interestingly	enough,	truthful	illusions	in	the	vein	of	art	are	not	only	consistent	with	the	transformative	character	of	conscious	conceptualization	and	its	historical	instantiation.	The	way	in	which	one	creates	and	affirms	a	truthful	illusion	(two	seemingly	irreconcilable	antimonies)	is	also	consistent	with	the	competing	nature	of	unconscious	states	that	constitute	our	conscious	states,	with	the	becoming	of	consciousness.		The	challenge	in	Chapter	One	was	to	explain	how	it	was	possible	for	a	multiplicity	of	unconscious	states	can	compete	with	as	well	as	constitute	a	singular	conscious	states.	The	challenge	in	Chapter	Two	was	to	explain	how	a	multiplicity	of	distorted	meanings	is	instantiated	in	a	singular	historical	concept.	The	challenge	in	the	present	context	is	to	understand	how	two	seemingly	opposing	virtues	such	as	honesty	(the	‘truthful’	aspect	of	the	concept	‘truthful	illusions’)	and	artistry	(the	‘illusion	‘aspect	of	the	concept	‘truthful	illusions’)	can	be	employed	in	a	new	way	of	finding	meaning	in	life	as	such,	i.e.	life	at	this	particular	point	in	history.			
Essentially,	we	must	ask	how	artistry’s	emphasis	on	creating	and	endorsing	
illusions	is	different	from	cowardly	faith	in	the	biblical	ideal	and	how	Nietzsche’s	
emphasis	on	intellectual	honesty	is	different	from	world-denying	asceticism.	Nietzsche	believes,	as	we	know,	that	most	of	our	‘knowledge’	can	be	traced	back	to	simple	errors	that	were	accepted	as	a	circumstance	of	life,	which	eventually	began	to	compete	with	other	claims	rooted	in	basic	errors	of	a	similar	vein.	We	choose	which	basic	error	is	most	compatible	with	our	experiences,	according	to	Nietzsche.	Nietzsche	says	real	knowledge	and	honesty	begins	when	we	find	these	errors	and	
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pick	the	illusions,	which	are	most	useful	and	most	compatible	to	our	experiences	and	our	goals	and	then	make	them	our	‘Truths,’	so	to	speak.	For	Nietzsche,	the	way	to	find	valuable	artistic	illusions	that	are	not	(a)	instances	of	cowardly	faith	in	an	ideal	with	poor	proof	of	strength	(based	solely	on	the	truth	of	convention)	and	(b)	intellectually	honest	(but	not	in	the	way	of	world-denying	asceticism)	is	to	experimentally	answer	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence.			
3.2	Honesty	and	Artistry	through	the	Eternal	Recurrence	and	Redemption	of	Meaning	A	proper	understanding	of	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	is	meant	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	parallels	hinted	above	in	the	relationships	of	truth	and	illusion	to	honesty	and	artistry.	If	one	reacts	with	joy	to	the	prospect	of	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	(the	exercise	of	imagining	the	endless	recurrence	of	one’s	life	in	the	same	exact	way	that	it	is	lived	now),	then	presumably	one	has	lived	a	happy	life.	Let	us	now	try	and	understand	how	an	honest	analysis	of	one’s	life,	by	way	of	this	doctrine,	can	help	us	find	the	most	useful	artistic	illusions.	Anderson	gives	us	an	objective	way,	so	to	speak,	for	individuals	to	analyze	their	lives	that	accounts	for	the	perspectival	nature	of	conscious	analysis.	Anderson	writes:		It	becomes	clear	that	Nietzsche’s	test	does	identify	a	substantively	important	part	of	what	makes	a	life	good	–	viz.,	a	deep-going	consistency	between	the	agent’s	avowed	values	and	her	actual	life...Avoiding	such	inconsistency	or	division	within	the	person	is	deeply	important	to	Nietzsche.	(NTIR	199)		
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As	long	as	each	individual	lives	a	life	that	is	consistent	with	their	values	insofar	as	their	actions,	for	the	most	part,	are	embodiments	thereof,	as	much	as	they	can	be,	this	consistency	or	harmony	should	bring	about	a	joyful	response	when	positing	the	prospect	of	eternal	recurrence.	Judging	value-action	consistency	in	this	way	is	difficult	due	to	the	possibility	of	self-deception	but,	if	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	is	understood	in	the	strict	sense	of	the	phrase,	it	forces	the	individual	to	assess	her	life	honestly.	This	approach	which	hopefully	mitigates	the	possibility	of	suspiciously	overemphasizing	the	future	and	understating	the	past	in	a	way	that	results	in	a	bad	faith	positive	judgment	about	one’s	life.		If	every	detail	of	every	event	of	one’s	life	must	eternally	recur,	then	affirming	one’s	life	with	joy	at	the	thought	of	this	recurrence	would	be	genuine	or	honest,	but	if	unharmonious	events	could	be	left	out,	then	this	affirmation	would	be	in	bad	faith.	Unfortunately,	however,	in	our	actual	lives,	as	Anderson	notes,	rarely	do	our	actions	always	line	up	with	our	values,	which	may	prompt	one	to	say	that	Nietzsche	is	endorsing	a	type	of	affirmation	that	is	inherently	impossible	and	is	therefore	self-defeating	in	the	same	way	as	the	ascetic	priest	is	self-defeating.	However,	Nietzsche	is	not	saying	that	in	order	to	affirm	the	eternal	recurrence	of	every	detail	of	one’s	life	that	each	minute	detail	of	one’s	life	must	be	harmonious	with	one’s	values.	Nietzsche	is	simply	saying	that	we	must	look	at	our	lives	as	a	whole,	which	includes	actions	that	were	and	were	not	in	harmony	with	our	values.	Therefore,	if	one	had	acted	in	a	way	that	did	not	exemplify	one’s	values,	if	it	was	for	a	greater	purpose	(i.e.	learning	from	one’s	mistakes),	then	the	entirety	of	one’s	life	can	still	be	affirmed	in	
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its	minute	detail	eternally,	including	the	unharmonious	actions.	Anderson	states,	“Fragmentary,	accidental,	puzzling,	or	regrettable	aspects	of	a	person’s	life	or	character	can	be	redeemed	by	being	brought	into	a	whole	that	the	person	can	affirm”	(NTIR	200).		Anderson	wants	to	understand	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	in	a	manner	that	allows	for	a	subject	to	affirm	their	life	by	understanding	their	unharmonious	actions	in	the	context	of	the	completeness	of	their	life	in	order	to	illustrate	harmony	in	the	whole	of	one’s	actions	and	the	entirety	of	the	narrative	of	one’s	life.	In	order	to	do	so,	Anderson	states	that	we	need	a	strategy	and,	“that	is	the	task	of	redemption,	which	Zarathustra	characterizes	as	a	product	of	‘willing’	and	‘creating’”	(NTIR	200).	Nietzsche	himself	can	be	cited	in	support	here:		[One	must]	create	and	carry	into	One	what	is	fragment	and	riddle	and	dreadful	accident…To	redeem	those	who	lived	in	the	past,	and	to	recreate	all	‘it	was’	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it’	–	that	alone	should	I	call	redemption…All	‘it	was’	is	a	fragment,	a	riddle,	a	dreadful	accident	–	until	the	creative	will	says	to	it,	‘But	thus	I	willed	it.’	Until	the	will	says	to	it,	“But	thus	I	will	it;	thus	I	shall	will	it.”	(Zarathustra	II,	‘Redemption’)	At	this	juncture,	we	can	understand	not	only	the	value	in	assessing	one’s	life	through	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	as	such,	but	we	can	also	understand	how	honestly	assessing	one’s	life	by	accounting	for	unharmonious	action	actually	allows	us	to	retroactively	create	meaning	out	of	the	unharmonious	actions	within	the	context	of	
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the	whole	of	one’s	life	by	turning	an	‘it	was’	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it.’	One	may	argue	that	this	transformation	of	or	this	useful	distortion	of	an	‘it	was’	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it’	is	an	inauthentic,	self-deceptive,	and	self-defeating	notion	of	redemption.	Although	we	will	further	explicate	how	this	narrative	redemption	is	authentic,	it	is	important	to	ask	ourselves	at	this	juncture	if	this	concern	is	itself	authentic	or	if	it	is	overtly	influenced	by	our	historically	inauthentic	conception	of	Truth.	This	retroactive	affirmation	runs	dangerously	close	to	inauthentic	affirmation,	which	is	why	we	must	elaborate	two	points.	First,	turning	an	‘it	was’	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it’	retroactively	can	be	genuine	if	it	is	simply	changing	one’s	perspective	on	how	one	views	one’s	failures	or	shortcomings	in	the	context	of	the	success	of	the	entirety	of	one’s	life.	Second,	and	most	importantly,	we	can	do	this	in	the	present,	not	only	retroactively.	The	following	explication	of	the	necessity	of	the	pretense	of	the	belief	in	an	artistic	illusion	yet	to	be	affirmed,	which	is	then	affirmed	over	time,	is	consistent	with	how	we	are	‘familiar’	with	our	conscious	concepts	before	they	are	conceptualized.	Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of	the	eternal	recurrence	as	such	illustrates	a	way	in	which	we	can	take	hardships	in	stride.		Anderson	uses	the	example	of	Jimmy	Carter’s	loss	to	Ronald	Reagan	in	the	presidential	election	of	1980,	which	threatened	to	define	his	career	as	a	failure.	As	Anderson	puts	it,	Carter	redeemed	the	‘it	was’	of	his	loss	by	turning	it	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it’	by	transforming	his	Presidential	library	into	the	‘Carter	Center,’	which	allowed	him	to	work	on	important	projects	such	as,	“disease	eradication,	human	rights	protection,	and	poverty	alleviation,”	culminating	in	the	2002	Nobel	Prize	for	
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Peace	and	the	“greatest	U.S.	Ex-Presidency	ever”	(NTIR	201).	Clearly,	even	though	Carter	might	not	want	to	only	will	the	eternal	recurrence	of	his	1980	loss	to	Reagan,	in	the	context	of	his	entire	life	including	his	rise	to	moral	leadership	hitherto	unknown	by	an	ex-President,	Carter	would	most	definitely	want	to	will	that	loss	since	it	gave	him	the	opportunity	to	achieve	great	success	outside	of	the	world	of	‘white	house’	politics	that	he	most	likely	would	not	have	been	able	to	achieve	within	the	context	and	limitations	of	a	presidency.	Anderson	continues	by	acknowledging	that	Carter	did	not	know	that	his	loss	in	the	election	of	1980	would	actually	work	out	for	the	best,	but	he	also	acknowledges	that	foreknowledge	of	the	success	of	a	‘thus	I	willed	it’	is	beside	the	point.	Anderson	states,	“Nietzsche	is	aware	that	having	a	good	life	in	his	sense	often	depends	on	luck.	But	it	was	not	merely	luck	that	effected	Carter’s	redemption.	He	also	had	to	do	something”	(NTIR	202).		This	understanding	of	redemption,	by	way	of	turning	an	‘it	was’	into	a	‘thus	I	willed	it,’	helps	illustrate	the	practical	meaning	of	the	thought	experiment	of	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence.	The	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	precludes	the	possibility	of	feeling	as	though	we	have	moved	beyond	our	past	failures	and	forces	us	to	create	meaning	out	of	these	past	failures	in	a	way	that	is	harmonious	with	our	values	in	the	context	of	our	entire	life.		The	measure	of	that	meaning	corresponds	to	genuinely	affirming	the	eternal	recurrence	of	our	lives,	which	is	to	say	that	we	must	create	useful	conceptions	of	them,	useful	truthful	illusions.	Furthermore,	as	noted	above,	creating	these	conceptions	also	allows	us	to	bring	a	good	or	hopeful	conscience	to	our	failures	in	the	present	by	“taking	arms	against	our	troubles”	and	
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constructing	“a	unifying,	redemptive	story	rendering	life	meaningful	and	affirmable”	(NTIR	202).		By	orienting	oneself	towards	one’s	life	in	this	way,	narrative	becomes	the	ruling	principle	of	one’s	self-understanding,	which,	in	turn,	helps	shape	new	events	in	one’s	life	and	helps	one	create	a	meaning	for	the	entirety	of	one’s	life.	This	is	just	to	say	that	one	is	attempting	to	bring	about	a	good	conscience,	as	well	as	one	can,	towards	their	newly	created	concepts	that	are	just	as	distorted	as	the	self-defeating	ones,	but	hopefully	more	useful.	This	utility,	of	course,	is	confirmed	in	the	future.	The	experimental	answers	given	to	the	doctrine	of	eternal	recurrence	help	us	understand	how	we	can	orient	our	conscience	towards	our	lives	in	a	more	healthy	way,	so	to	speak,	in	order	to	create	conceptions	of	our	life	that	best	uncover	meaning.		Yet	how	honesty	and	artistry	are	different	from	an	ascetic	will	to	truth	and	blind	faith	remains	to	be	elucidated.	Such	an	elucidation	is	necessary	to	determine	how	to	create	meaning	in	our	lives	despite	our	historically	affected	becoming	of	consciousness.	Nietzsche	thinks	that	artists	know	how	to	create	beautiful	things	out	of	an	honest	assessment	of	the	world	that	is	illusory	in	a	way	that	does	not	completely	do	away	with	honesty.		Moving	away	from	things	until	there	is	much	of	them	that	no	one	longer	sees	and	much	that	one	must	‘see	into’	them,	in	order	still	to	see	
them…all	this	we	should	learn	from	artists	while	being	wiser	than	they	are	in	other	things.	(GS	299)	Anderson	illustrates	that	we	must	not	only	learn	how	to	make	things	beautiful	from	
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artists,	but	we	must	also	learn	how	to	acknowledge	the	beauty	in	things	especially	when	they	are	not	beautiful	in	themselves.	This	change	in	perspective	towards	the	beauty	of	a	thing	is	a	meaningful	change	in	the	actual	beauty	of	the	thing	because	nothing	is	purely	in	itself	without	a	for-another	structure.	All	facts	are	necessarily	perspectival.	An	artist’s	creation	of	beauty	onto	a	thing	and	our	positing	of	meaning	onto	our	life	are	just	as	authentic	as	our	conscious	transformation	and	our	historical	distortion.	This	kind	of	redemptive	meaning	is	Truthful	as	such.	While	neither	Nietzsche	nor	Anderson	explicitly	discuss	a	necessary	connection	between	truth	and	honesty	nor	between	illusion	and	artistry,	an	implicit	connection	between	the	pairs	of	relationships	should	be	obvious.	Despite	the	similarities	in	the	names	of	each	term,	the	relationship	between	honesty	and	artistry	as	honestly,	but	artistically	creating	a	beautiful	illusion	out	of	something	not	beautiful	is	clearly	similar	to	how	distortions	do	not	preclude	the	possibility	of	positive	truth	claims.	Anderson	makes	a	cognate	point	when	he	observes:		By	all	these	means,	artistic	representation	glorifies	its	object	by	depicting	it	as	other	than	it	is…’we	want	to	be	poets	of	our	lives’…the	artistic	redemption	that	Nietzsche	seeks…is	a	‘counterforce’	against	our	honesty.	(NTIR	205,	GS	299,	GS	107)	Nietzsche	wants	us	to	be	poets	of	our	lives	by	creating	artistic	illusions	out	of	our	honest	assessment	of	our	lives.	Clearly,	at	this	point,	Nietzsche	not	only	thinks	that	there	is	a	genuine	perspective	and	distortion	behind	all	of	our	simple	and	useful	truths,	he	thinks	there	is	a	genuine	perspective	and	distortion	behind	even	the	
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truths	that	allow	us	to	discern	these	perspectives	and	distortions	as	well.	But	he	also	thinks	that	in	valuing	our	own	lives	and	attempting	to	affirm	the	world	as	beautiful	even	when	it	is	not,	we	need	a	healthy	dose	of	artistry	and	artistic	illusion	in	order	to	balance	a	pure	will	to	truth.	This	is	why	Anderson	asserts	that	the	will	to	truth	and	the	will	to	illusion	stand	in	tension	with	one	another,	but	do	not	contradict	one	another.	The	way	in	which	the	will	to	truth	and	the	will	to	illusion	are	antinomies	that	regulate	each	other,	but	are	present	in	a	singular	instance	of	an	artistic	illusion	is	similar	to	how	antonymous	wills	are	present	in	a	singular	conscious	state	and	how	antonymous	meanings	are	present	in	singular	concepts	and	moral	valuations.	“Nietzsche’s	ideal,”	Anderson	contends,	“is	precisely	a	virtue	in	which	the	honesty	of	‘scientific	thinking’	is	synthesized	with	illusion-generating	‘artistic	forces’,	plus	the	practical	wisdom	to	deploy	both	in	the	service	of	perfecting	human	life”	(NTIR	206).	Anderson	thinks	that	this	synthesis	is	not	a	mere	fantasy	since	honesty	and	artistry	are	not	constitutive	principles,	but	regulative	principles	allowing	for	them	to	be	simultaneously	valid,	yet	have	opposing	tendencies.	Upon	scrutiny,	honestly	affirmed	artistic	illusions	are	truthful	by	the	very	standards	of	valuation	that	would	trick	one	into	thinking	that	these	artistic	illusions	are	false.	If	honesty	and	artistry	are	regulative	principles	that	are	meant	to	limit	each	other,	then	clearly	Nietzsche	thinks	we	must	balance	the	two	in	a	way	that	tells	the	narrative	of	our	lives	in	the	most	beautiful	and	meaningful	way	possible	that	also	does	not	oppose	the	possibility	of	honest	affirmation.	Of	course,	we	do	not	want	to	sound	like	a	Walgreens	greeting	card	philosopher	or,	to	use	a	more	modern	
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example,	a	feel	good	empty	Facebook	meme	maker.	So,	we	should	clarify	what	stating	that	the	narrative	of	our	lives	is	meant	to	make	life	beautiful	means.	Life	is	supposed	to	be	made	beautiful	from	a	truthful	illusion	in	the	sense	that	art	is	made	beautiful.	However	in	the	context	of	our	lives	it	makes	more	sense	to	say	that	the	artist’s	way	of	making	something	beautiful	is	akin	to	the	creation	of	meaning	as	the	narrative	whole	of	a	truthful	illusion.	As	we	already	know,	due	to	the	thoroughly	perspectival	condition	of	cognition,	the	intellectual	conscience	can	never	know	a	thing	in	itself,	apart	from	interpretation,	but	that	does	not	mean	it	does	not	know	useful	and	simple	truths	or	even	intellectual	truths.	Clearly,	over	the	course	of	
history,	mankind	has	posited	the	temporarily	useful	truths	of	Christianity,	the	simple	
truths	of	phenomenology,	as	well	as	the	intellectual	truths	of	science.	In	this	vein,	
honesty	demands	that	we	are	aware	of	the	final	and	certain	reasons	within	the	limits	
of	perspectival	character	of	cognizing	in	order	to	find	the	most	useful	or	‘cognitively	
superior’	illusions	that	are	still	true	to	our	the	phenomena.	Just	as	the	raw	sense	material	of	perception	takes	on	a	different	meaning	in	the	logicizing	of	cognition,	which	is	both	truthful	and	characterized	by	a	transformation,	the	facts	of	one’s	life,	discerned	through	an	honest	assessment	thereof,	take	on	a	different	meaning	by	abstracting	away	and	fitting	them	into	a	larger	narrative	(“thus	I	willed	it”)	of	the	whole	of	one’s	life.	The	regulating	yet	constituting	character	of	honesty	and	artistry	in	
the	process	of	redeeming	the	meaning	of	one’s	life	through	affirming	artistic	illusions	
is	paralleled	by	the	way	in	which	our	unconscious	perceptions	are	perspectivally	
transformed	into	concepts,	by	the	presence	of	competing	unconscious	wills	in	the	
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constitution	or	generation	of	conscious	states,	and	by	the	presence	of	antonymous	
meanings	in	a	singular	concept.	This	is	not	to	say	that	one	grounds	the	other;	the	parallels	are	noted	in	order	to	point	to	the	unity	across	Nietzsche’s	vast	body	of	work.		To	finish	our	discussion	of	redemption,	Anderson	focuses	on	what	we	would	need	to	do	to	actually	create	values,	to	actually	make	an	object	beautiful	and	to	no	longer	deceive	oneself.	In	order	to	get	out	of	an	interpretation	of	artistry	that	reduces	it	to	a	mere	pretense,	Anderson	explicates	Nietzsche’s	theory	on	Raphael’s	
Transfiguration	in	The	Birth	of	Tragedy	IV.	Nietzsche	thinks	that	the	content	of	the	painting,	Christ’s	redeeming	the	possessed	boy,	is	merely	a	symbol	for	Raphael’s	larger	point	about	the	redemption	of	life	through	art.	Anderson	states,	“The	beauteous	vision	of	Christ’s	transfiguration	depicted	in	the	painting	symbolizes	the	experience	of	viewing	the	painting	itself,	whose	actual	splendor	does	the	real	work	of	transfiguring	the	possessed	boy,	bewildered	disciples,	and	the	rest,	into	something	that	is,	unquestionably	beautiful”	(NTIR	209).	Here,	Anderson	notes,	that	we	‘pretend’	the	patches	of	color	on	the	painting	are	the	possessed	boy	and	the	confused	disciples,	similar	to	how	the	individual,	concrete,	and	nonconceptual	content	of	unconscious	perception	is	distorted	by	our	conscious	conceptualization.	Yet	we	do	not	pretend	that	the	painting	as	a	whole	is	beautiful.		The	painting	simply	is	beautiful,	it	is	truly	made	beautiful	through	this	illusion	of	the	brushstrokes	as	the	possessed	boy,	et	cetera.	This	is	artistry’s	role	in	redemption,	to	actually	make	things	beautiful	thereby	truly	bestowing	value.	
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Conclusion	At	the	end	of	our	investigation,	it	does	not	seem	so	absurd	as	it	did	at	the	onset	to	state	that	our	commonly	accepted	conception	of	self	is	distorted,	if	not	false!	There	is	clearly	a	thoroughgoing	distorting	character	inherent	in	the	three	determined	aspects	of	the	unity	of	the	self.	Of	course,	the	distorting	character	of	the	self	in	the	present	is	exhibited	by	the	way	conscious	states	transform	and	logicize	unconscious	perceptions.	The	way	in	which	this	distorting	nature	has	manifested	itself	in	the	past	is	exhibited	by	the	way	our	valuations	of	good	become	valued	as	evil,	how	our	valuations	of	bad	become	valued	as	good,	how	legal	notions	of	debt	become	religious	notions	of	guilt,	how	our	good	conscience	towards	ourselves	becomes	a	bad	conscience	towards	ourselves,	and	how	our	valuing	of	religious	truth	becomes	our	valuing	of	scientific	truth.	Of	course,	the	self-defeating	affects	of	the	final	instance	of	historical	revaluation	is	what	grounds	the	necessity	of	finding	a	new	system	of	valuation	that	better	allows	for	us	to	create	meaning	in	internal	time	that	reconciles	external	time	by	being	consistent	with	the	values	thereof.	Further,	the	prospects	of	the	self	in	the	future	are	not	simply	‘distorted’	in	virtue	of	their	being	affected	by	the	historical	distortive	instantiation	of	conceptual	transformations	in	conscious	states,	but	also	by	the	ways	in	which	we	artistically	redeem	the	negative	facts	of	our	internal	timeline	through	affirming	a	narrative	that	unifies	the	meaning	of	these	facts	about	our	past	with	activity	in	the	future.	It	should	be	somewhat	clear,	now,	as	to	why	the	success	of	finding	meaning	in	life	and	therefore	being	happy	is	necessarily	predicated	over	the	success	of	catching	up	to	oneself	in	this	way;	we	
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could	not	accurately	diagnose	ourselves	nor	could	we	effectively	treat	ourselves	if	our	historical	self	was	too	far	ahead	of	our	present	self.	But,	what	can	be	said	about	the	being	conscious	of	this	project	of	catching	up	to	oneself?		 This	is	where	Buddhist	metaphysical	principles	can	psychologically	orient	oneself	towards	rectifying	one’s	historically	affected	sickness	of	grossly	overvaluing	Truth	at	the	expense	of	meaning.	The	last	task	of	this	paper	is	to	make	intelligible	the	possible	role	the	valued	concepts	of	Buddhist	metaphysics	can	play	in	our	becoming	healthier.	A	brief	examination	of	the	esoteric	relationship	between	content	and	style	in	Nietzsche’s	philosophic	system	suggests	that,	while	Nietzsche	spoke	unfavorably	about	Buddhism	in	his	lifetime,	Nietzsche	himself	valued	the	same	concepts	that	are	most	significantly	valued	in	Buddhist	metaphysics.	These	values,	of	course,	are	a	treatment	for	our	historical	sickness	since	it	could	restore	our	good	conscience	towards	the	singular	instantiation	of	antinomies,	towards	illusion.	Again,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Nietzsche	does	not	want	to	discredit	truth	and	science.	He	just	wants	to	make	room	at	the	top	of	our	mountain	of	valuation	for	illusion	next	to	truth.	So,	too,	the	Buddhist	metaphysical	principles	of	nothingness,	flux,	impermanence,	and	emptiness	are	values,	which	if	held	to	the	same	standard	as	truth,	can	help	restore	our	good	conscience	towards	illusion,	which	is,	again,	necessary	for	us	to	find	meaning	in	our	age	of	the	self-defeating	valuation	of	Truth	over	and	above	all	other	values.			 In	order	to	show	how	the	aforementioned	concepts	that	are	valued	as	the	highest	values	in	Buddhist	metaphysics	can	help	resolve	our	historically	affected	
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consciousness	as	such,	let	us	briefly	recount	how	Nietzsche’s	deliberately	unsystematic	philosophy	(and	style)	itself	echoes	these	Buddhist	metaphysical	concepts.	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	supports	the	view	of	the	self	constantly	in	
flux,	moving	from	one	conscious	state	to	the	next	without	a	unifying,	behind-the-scenes	ego.	Further,	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind	supports	a	view	of	the	self	that	is	impermanent,	a	‘singular’	and	‘fixed’	instantiation	multiplicity	of	competing	wills	which	themselves	are	fleeting.	Not	co-incidentally,	both	aspects	of	this	view	of	the	self	and	the	mind	are	reinforced	by	the	aphoristic,	non-linear	style	in	which	Nietzsche	elaborates	them.	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	history	contends	that	moral	concepts	are	also	constantly	in	flux,	only	existing	contingently	not	as	fixed	and	divinely	inspired.	Moreover,	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	history	contends	that	moral	concepts	are	filled	with	these	contingent,	superficial	meanings	in	a	way	that	supports	the	view	that	the	notion	of	objective	moral	concepts	such	as	‘Truth’	and	‘Reason’	are	inherently	empty.	Here	too,	the	genre	in	which	Nietzsche	expounds	the	doctrine,	namely,	a	polemic,	is	a	fitting	vehicle	for	it.	Also,	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	meaning	supports	a	view	that	there	is	no	objective	meaning	to	life;	instead	the	only	meanings	are	those	subjectively	posited.	What	more	apt	form	to	present	the	content	of	his	philosophy	of	meaning	than	the	fictional,	redemptive	narrative,	Thus	Spoke	
Zarathustra.	Further,	it	is	fitting	that	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	meaning,	which	rails	against	the	notion	of	Truth	set	into	motion	by	the	Christian	ethic,	is	presented	in	an	allegorical	fiction	deliberately	resembling	the	Bible.	Moreover,	the	way	in	which	the	inner	structure	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	of	mind,	history,	and	meaning	all	bleed	
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into	each	other	supports	a	view	of	Nietzsche’s	whole	philosophical	system	as	in	flux	and	purposefully	unsystematic.	Finally,	the	presence	of	deliberately	contradictory	and	unreconciled	statements	across	Nietzsche’s	unsystematic	system	is	itself	an	exercise	in	cultivating	a	good	conscience	towards	the	presence	of	competing,	antonymous,	and	regulating	wills,	meanings,	and	artistic	illusions	in	singular	instantiations	of	conscious	states,	moral	values,	and	redemptive	truths.		 In	the	aforementioned	ways,	Nietzsche’s	approach	to	selfhood	values	some	of	the	most	basic	Buddhist	principles	(nothingness,	flux,	impermanent,	emptiness).	This	similarity	raises	some	interesting,	fundamental	questions.	What	would	happen	if	Western	societies	made	room	for	these	concepts	at	the	top	of	our	system	of	valuation?	Would	we,	as	members	of	these	societies,	have	a	better	conscience	towards	the	presence	of	competing	wills	in	our	present	selves?	Would	we	have	a	better	conscience	towards	(and	understanding	of)	the	ugly	origins	of	our	modern	values,	their	lack	of	objective	Truth,	and	their	self-defeating	nature?	Would	we	be	able	to	reconcile	ourselves	by	creating	illusions	for	ourselves,	enabling	us	to	honestly	affirm	the	negative	facts	of	our	internal	timeline	in	order	to	meaningfully	project	ourselves	into	the	future?	Would	we	be	happier?	Once	we	have	finally	caught	up	to	ourselves,	in	this	Nietzschean	context,	are	Buddhist	metaphysical	principles	the	best	way	to	help	us	develop	a	good	conscience	towards	ourselves	as	such?		
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Interests:	Nutrition,	Health,	Running,	Weight	Lifting,	Soccer,	Basketball,	Boxing,	Martial	Arts,	Yoga,	Snowboarding,	History,	Art,	Literature,	Poetry,	Philosophy,	Religion,	Politics,	Consumer	&	Education	Technology,	Venture	Capital,	Angel	Investment,	and	Startup	Company	and	Sharing	Culture		
Summary:	I	am	a	graduate	student	at	Boston	University	working	on	my	Master's	Thesis	in	philosophy	with	an	interest	in	the	intersection	of	philosophy,	art,	technology,	entrepreneurship,	and	investment.	I	plan	to	leverage	the	strong	reasoning	skills	and	'know-how'	acquired	in	my	undergraduate	and	graduate	education	to	solve	problems	in	the	education	technology	and	art	spaces,	with	an	entrepreneurial	spirit	of	course!		 			
